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Territorial sea delimitation, while one of the most intensely debated
issues prior to World War I, has largely been delegated to the sidelines of
ocean and coastal law. Modem students of maritime delimitation mostly
concern themselves with the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) and the continental shelf, and few, if any, significant diplomatic
problems associated with territorial sea boundaries have been recorded in
the last several decades. Indeed, while the literature on the delimitation of
the EEZ and the continental shelf is abundant and readily available,
questions concerning the territorial sea delimitation are seldom raised.
The reasons for these phenomena are not overly surprising. Primarily,
in the last twenty-five years there have been few important judicial or
arbitration case on the territorial sea delimitation.' Instead, the period has
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Department of State. J.D. Boalt Hall School of Law (University of California,
Berkeley), 2002; M.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1998; B.A., University of
California, Berkeley, 1997.
** Eds. Note: Many sources used in this article are only available in the Croatian and
Slovenian languages. Except where noted, the Author has provided translation of those
sources that OCLJ has relied upon for editing purposes. Those translations are on file with
OCU.
1. PROSPER WEll, THE LAW OF MARrruME DELMrATION-REFL.EcrIONS 135 (1989)
[hereinafter MARrrhmE DEuITATION]. Writing in 1989, Weil mentions a period of "the last
fifteen years." Id. Research of the 1989-2002 period has indicated that little has changed
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been dominated by instances of negotiated territorial sea delimitation
between the concerned parties. Also, delimitation of the territorial sea is
a relatively simple affair, at least when compared to the EEZ or continental
shelf delimitation. The modest twelve mile width of the territorial sea,2
and the fact that the distorting effects of equidistance lines are "compara-
tively small within the limits of territorial waters,"3 both allow for a
relatively smooth process. Finally, the EEZ and the continental shelf
delimitation is largely governed by the customary law that, as courts have
defined it, is based on the rule of equitable principles and equitable
solution.' The territorial sea delimitation, on the other hand, is governed
by the equidistance and the special circumstances rule which is embodied
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),5 and has
been accepted without much controversy since the first territorial sea
convention.6
Since the break up of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia,
however, there has been a dramatic rise of instances involving the need for
the delimitation of territorial seas. The questions regarding such delimita-
tion have emerged largely due to the fact that although land boundaries
between the republics of these federal states were firmly established in
most cases, delimitation was never carried out at sea. Problems regarding
the delimitation of the territorial seas within the former Soviet Union have
arisen in the Baltic, the Black Sea, as well as the Caspian Sea.7 Nonethe
since that time.
2. The Law of the Sea Convention declares twelve nautical miles as the maximum
breadth of territorial sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
LOSC]. The LOSC is binding only upon those states that have ratified it-142 states as of
the time of this writing. See Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the
related Agreements, as at 28 February 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_
files/status2003.p df (last visited March 6, 2003). The twelve-mile limit, however, is now
probably firmly established in international law. Indeed, only fifteen countries continue to
claim territorial seas wider than twelve miles. See ROBIN CHURCHILL& A. VAUGHAN LOWE,
THE LAW OF THE SEA 471 (1999) [hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA].
3. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20), para. 59. Also, "owing to the very close proximity of such waters to the coasts
concerned, these effects are much less marked and may be very slight..d." Id. para. 8.
4. MARITIME DELIMITATION, supra note 1, at 136.
5. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 15.
6. MARIrIME DELIMITATION, supra note 1, at 136.
7. For an account of the boundary disputes in the Caspian Sea and the Baltic Sea, see
Paul Goble, Russia: Analysis from Washington-When Borders are Disputed, RFEIRL, Dec.
6, 1999, available at http://www.rferl.orglncalfeaturesl1999/121F.RU.991206145039.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2003). For an account of the need for delimitation in the Black Sea and
the Azov Sea, see RFE/RL, Ukraine, Russia Complete Delimitation of Land Border,
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less, despite of its relatively small size, the former Yugoslavia has produced
some of the most contested territorial sea delimitation problems in recent
history.
Croatia, in particular, having the longest coastline of all the former
Yugoslav republics, has contested its territorial seas with all of its former
republican neighbors-Bosnia, Slovenia, and Serbia-Montenegro.' While
the Croatian dispute with Bosnia was largely solved in 1999, and the
boundary negotiations with Serbia-Montenegro have been restarted in
recent months, Croatia's maritime dispute with Slovenia in the Bay of Piran
and further in the Bay of Trieste has been the most controversial bilateral
issue between the two countries ever since their independence in 1991.
Despite the increased activity aimed at resolving this problem in the past
three years, which included an agreement between the two countries' prime
ministers,9 a solution is not in sight.'" Unless a negotiated solution
satisfactory to both countries is reached soon, the issue will probably have
to be submitted to an international judicial or arbitration body. This article
makes a contribution by offering a detailed study of this unusual case of the
territorial sea delimitation," and by proposing several solutions for solving
RFE/RL NEwSLNE, Nov. 16, 2001, available at http://rferl.org/newsline/2001/11/161101.
asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). See also http://www.worldlanguage.com/Countries/
Ukraine.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
8. Both the land and the maritime boundary with Bosnia was contested around the only
Bosnian outlet to the Adriatic Sea at Neum, the maritime boundary with Slovenia in the Bay
of Piran and beyond has been one of the thorniest issues in the Croatian-Slovenian relations,
and the land and maritime boundary between Croatia and Montenegro at the Prevlaka
peninsula required the posting of a United Nations (UN) observer mission (United Nations
Mission on Prevlaka-UNMOP) there. Serbia and Montenegro claimed the name "the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" for their loose federation until March 2002, but have since
agreed to the name "Serbia and Montenegro." For the purposes of clarity and brevity, this
entity will be referred to as "Serbia-Montenegro."
9. Pogodba Med Republiko Slovenijo in Republiko Hrvagko o Skupni Dr avni Meji
(Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the State
Border) (translation from the Slovenian by Andrej Milivojevid) [hereinafter Agreement].
The Agreement was initialed on July 20, 2001, but it must be ratified by the parliaments of
both countries before it can enter into force. This agreement is not available in any library
or electronic sources. A copy in the Slovenian language was obtained by author from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, and this copy is on file with the
author.
10. Indeed, it appears that Croatia has backed away from the initialed agreement, and its
government indicated that "it will soon begin to 'prepare new negotiating positions' because
it is 'mindful of the fact that the majority opinion in the Parliament is against the Agree-
ment."' Marko Barii , Novi pregovori o granici sa Slovenijom? [New Negotiations on the
Boundary with Slovenia?], VJESNIK, June 14, 2002, at 3 [hereinafter New Negotiations]
(quoting Dra en Budiga, Croatia's Deputy Prime Minster).
11. It appears that no academic study of the problem has been published in any English-
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this problem through friendly, bilateral negotiations in order to avoid a
costly and protracted dispute before an independent third body, an option
that, as will be shown, would not benefit the interests of either country.
11. THE BAY OF PIRAN AND THE BAY OF TRIESTE:
DEEP DIVISIONS IN SHALLOW WATERS
Croatian and Slovenian secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991
brought about a need to delimit the boundaries of these two newly-
independent states. While the land boundaries between the former
Yugoslav republics were largely agreed upon well before the break up of
the country, no delimitation was carried out at sea.' 2 Boundary negotiations
between the two countries began shortly after their independence, and were
especially intensified following the end of the war in Croatia in 1995." 3
Some land boundaries needed to be adjusted, mostly in order to take
account of the needs of the population living in the border region, but this
issue has not been nearly as perplexing or controversial as that of delimita-
tion that needed to be carried out at sea de novo. Indeed, while practically
every square inch of the land territory was officially included into one or
another municipality, thereby indicating which republic exercised
jurisdiction, no such official jurisdiction existed at sea." To be sure, there
was little need for such delimitation during the life of the Yugoslav
federation, as federal authorities exercised most of the control over the
language legal journal. While the issue of a territorial sea boundary between two small East
European states may seem insignificant, and thereby unworthy of an academic endeavor, the
specifics of the dispute, the solutions offered by the two sides, and the novelty of several
issues surrounding the dispute, all call for a detailed examination of this problem.
12. See, e.g., Kristian Turkalj, Razgranieenje teritorijalnog mora izmeh Hrvatske i
Slovenije u sjevernom Jadranu [Delimitation of the Territorial Sea between Croatia and
Slovenia in the Northern Adriatic] , 51 ZBORNIK PRAVNOG FAKULTETA U ZAGREBU 939-40
(2001) [hereinafter Delimitation].
13. Davorin Rudolf, Ribarskim svadama u piranskom zaljevu Slovenija nastoji
Hrvatsku prisiliti na teritorijalne ustupke [Slovenia is Attempting to Force Croatia to Make
Territorial Concessions by Using Fishermen's Quarrels in the Bay of Piran], VJESNIK, Aug.
18, 2002, at 10.
14. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 939-40.
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sea, 5 but Croatian and Slovenian independence placed the matter into the
realm of intemational law, calling for such delimitation to take place.
.... ( .G 5 .. .. ..... ..
Map Exhibit A
15. For a very early argument in support of delimitation at sea between municipalities
see LucuAN Kos, PODJELA NAEG OBALNOG MORA NA OPCINE [MUNICIPAL DIVISION OF OUR
COASTAL SEA], (1970). To be sure, writing in the late 1960s, Kos was not so fortuitous as
to propose that the potential break-up of Yugoslavia was one of the reasons for his advocacy
of municipal delimitation of the sea. Nonetheless, he raised a number of important
arguments in support of such delimitation, ranging from maritime safety, exploitation of
natural resources, access to ship wrecks, fishing, pollution prevention, and, most
importantly, legislative and enforcement jurisdictio. Id. at 16-23. Kos' proposal was not
limited to mere advocacy that delimitation of the sea between municipalities be carried out.
On the contrary, more than two-thirds of his study is devoted to making specific recommen-
dations as to where municipal boundaries at sea should lie, and he used the equidistance
method in all cases except for some specifically-mentioned islands. Id. at 27-8. As a result,
Kos' proposal for the area of concern to this article uses the line of equidistance in the Bay
of Piran and the Bay of Trieste, as evidenced both by the proposed coordinates for the
Slovenian Piran municipality, id. at 52-3, and the Croatian Umag municipality, id. at 64,
encompassing the area in question, as well as from a map app., id. insert. It must be borne
in mind that this study was a proposal only, and that neither its general nor specific
recommendations were ever adopted. Moreover, having been written at the time when the
Yugoslav federation was still particularly strong, it can be safely assumed that this proposal
never contemplated any problems arising under international law. As such, the value of the
study to this article is not found in any of its specific recommendations regarding the lines
of municipal delimitation at sea. Rather, Kos' study demonstrates that despite the existence
of detailed and serious proposals on the topic, the Yugoslav federation never found it
important enough to carry out such delimitation, underlining the fact that any territorial sea
delimitation between what now are independent states must be carried out de novo either
through negotiations or through third-body mechanisms.
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The area subject to delimitation 6 between the two countries lies in the
northern Adriatic, namely in the Bay of Trieste. Included in this area is the
small Bay of Piran, one coast of which belongs to Croatia and the other to
Slovenia. The land boundary between the two countries follows the course
of the Dragonja River which empties into the Bay of Piran roughly at its
middle. The waters of the Bay of Piran were considered the internal waters
of the former Yugoslavia, with the baseline stretching across its entrance.
The coasts of the Bay of Trieste belong to the three coastal states situated
around it: Italy, Croatia, and Slovenia. The former Yugoslavia and Italy
delimited the waters in the bay into two roughly equal parts, with the entire
area constituting the territorial sea of one or the other country. As a result,
no delimitation issues exist between Italy on the one hand and Croatia and
Slovenia on the other. The area of concern to this article, hence, is
bordered with the Croatian and Slovenian coasts on one side and with the
inherited Italian-Yugoslav territorial sea boundary on the other.'7
As far as the other characteristics are concerned, there exists no
problem of EEZ delimitation given the relatively small size of the area in
question. The Bay of Trieste is only twenty-four nautical miles wide at its
widest point, namely at the entrance into the bay, so each of the countries
is entitled to territorial sea only.'" Also, the Bay of Trieste and the Bay of
Piran are relatively shallow, with the average depth in the Bay of Trieste
constituting twenty to thirty meters,' 9 while the depth in most of the Bay
of Piran is less than fifteen meters. 20 The entrance into the Bay of Piran is
only about three miles wide.2'
Reduced to the basics, the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia
includes two questions: 1) the place of the boundary in the Bay of Piran,
and 2) the extent of the Slovenian territorial sea in the Bay of Trieste,
including Slovenia's access to the high seas.22 With regard to the first
question, Slovenia's underlining position is that the waters in the Bay of
16. See Map Exhibit A. Reproduced with the permission of the American Society of
International Law (@ American Society of International Law, 1993).
17. Id.
18. Croatia and Slovenia, as well as Italy, claim the territorial sea of twelve nautical
miles. LAW OFTHE SEA, supra note 2, app. 1, at 463-7 1.
19. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 953.
20. Id.
21. Id. Turkalj cites a figure of five kilometers which is roughly equal to three miles.
22. While it does not explicitly define the term "high seas," the LOSC states that its
provisions relating to the "high seas" apply to "all parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State .... "
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 86. Since no country claims an EEZ in the Adriatic, any areas
outside of the territorial seas of any particular country constitute the "high seas."
Delimitation, supra note 12, at 967.
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Piran constitute a single unit which should lie under Slovenia' s sovereignty,
despite the fact that one coast of the Bay undeniably belongs to Croatia.
Croatia's position, in turn, has been that those waters should be delimited
using the method of equidistance.23 As for the second question, Slovenia
has taken the position that its territorial sea should be extended to the point
where it is at least partly adjacent to the high seas in order to avoid the
"cut-off' of its territorial sea by the territorial seas of Italy and Croatia.24
Croatia's position, again, has been that the territorial sea boundary between
the two countries in the Bay of Trieste should follow the line of equidis-
tance, the cut-off effect of Slovenia' s waters notwithstanding.
Ill. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
A. Sources
The origins of the international law of the sea can be traced to 1609
when Hugo Grotius published a famous tract entitled Mare Liberum.25
Grotius was a forceful advocate of the freedom of the seas, and he
concluded that the seas were free and open for the purposes of navigation
and fishing by any nation.26 As the only exception to this general rule,
Grotius admitted jurisdiction without property rights in the waters
immediately adjoining coastal states.27 This exception was in line with the
generally accepted understanding of that time, that coastal states enjoyed
some rights to regulate international activities in the waters immediately
adjacent to their coasts.28 Interestingly enough, Grotius' conclusions
remained grounded in international practice for the next three centuries,
and territorial waters remained practically the sole exception29 to the
unchallenged rule of full freedom of the seas.
The breadth of the territorial sea, however, was not at all certain. The
most common tendency was to follow the so-called "cannon-shot" rule,
which allowed the territorial sea jurisdiction up to the point at which those
23. The method ofequidistance will be discussed in detail in Section III, infra.
24. If the method of equidistance is used, Slovenia's territorial sea will be entirely
surrounded by the territorial seas of Italy and Croatia.
25. JOSEPH KALO ET. AL COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 321 (3rd ed. 1999) [hereinafter
COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW]. Mare Liberum stands for "Free Seas" in Latin.
26. Id. at 322.
27. LAW OFTHE SEA, supra note 2, at 71.
28. Id.
29. The other exception concerned the "internal waters," such as small bays and gulfs,
where the coastal states exercised full jurisdictional and property rights. See COASTALAND
OCEAN LAW, supra note 25, at 323.
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waters could be controlled by shore-based cannon.3" This cannon-shot
doctrine, however, was probably not intended to allow for the establish-
ment of a continuous belt of territorial sea along the entire coast of a state,
but rather to acknowledge the right to have pockets of jurisdiction at those
places where the control by actual cannon was present. 3' Eventually, the
cannon-shot rule was replaced through the practice of claims and recogni-
tion of territorial sea width, and three nautical miles became a widely-
accepted, though not universal, customary standard.32
Save for custom, however, no official rules on the law of the sea were
developed until after World War I.33 The post-war period saw not only
increased attempts at codification of customary rules, but also marked the
end of an era of full freedom of the seas beyond the limited belt of
territorial sea. The trend began with the Truman Proclamation in 1945 of
exclusive jurisdiction over the natural resources of the United States'
continental shelf, the claim that, although without any legal support, soon
became embraced by most coastal states. 34 The claim and response process,
however, was not to end with the Truman Proclamation, and very soon a
number of coastal nations extended their territorial sea claims to twelve
miles, while some others, such as Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, began to claim
exclusive fishing zones within 200 miles off their coasts.35
The number of the competing claims and counter-claims turned the
simple and well-established law of the sea order into an uncharted territory
indeed. Extensive claims to territorial seas and exclusive fishing zones by
some nations, and refusals to recognize such claims by other states,
increased the possibility for conflict, creating a dire need for codification
of the international law of the sea. Such codification, to be sure, was made
possible by the creation of a number of international institutions, most
notably the United Nations (U.N.), following World War II. Hence, the
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was
organized by the U.N. General Assembly in 1958 in Geneva, and more than
eighty nations took part in the negotiations over the four draft treaties
previously completed by the International Law Commission. 36 Known
collectively as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the four
30. Id. at 322.
31. LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 2, at 77.
32. COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW, supra note 25, at 322.
33. Attempts to codify the existing customary rules were made by the League of
Nations following World War I, but the League collapsed before any work was completed.
Id. at 323.
34. Id. at 324.
35. Id. at 325-26.
36. Id. at 326.
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law-making treaties" that were adopted at UNCLOS I constituted the first
codification of any matter relating to the legal regime over the sea and
ocean expanses and resources.
Notably, there could be no agreement at UNCLOS I regarding the
breadth of the territorial sea, and the matter was left unresolved.3" A
subsequent attempt two years later at the Second United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 11) similarly produced no results,39
leaving the fate of the breadth of territorial sea to the claim and response
process for more than two decades. With the adoption of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea' in 1982, this and a number of other
matters were resolved and codified in the form of the most comprehensive
treaty on the law of the sea in history. The negotiations leading to this
Convention were held for nine years under the auspices of the Third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which began its
work in 1973, including more than 150 states in its deliberations, and the
Convention is now the most authoritative and the most comprehensive part
of the international law of the sea. As already noted,4' the provisions of
this Convention are binding only upon the 142 states that have ratified it,
and they supersede the four Geneva Conventions as far as these states are
concerned. 42 Considering that the Convention applies to all states of
concern to this article, the relevant provisions of this Convention only, and
not those of the four Geneva Conventions, will now be discussed in greater
detail.
37. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Feb. 27, 1958, 516
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, Feb.
27, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, Feb. 27, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the
Continental Shelf, Feb. 27, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
38. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 37, declaring the coastal states' right to
exercise sovereignty in the territorial sea, art. 1, and stating where the breadth of the
territorial sea shall be measured from, art. 3, but setting no limit of that breadth. The
Convention, however, stated that the territorial sea of a state whose coasts are opposite or
adjacent to the coasts of another state shall not extend "beyond the median line every point
of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured," absent a "historic title or other
special circumstances" or an agreement between them to the contrary. See id art. 12.
39. COASTAL AND OcEAN LAW, supra note 25, at 327. Interestingly, a proposal for a
six-mile territorial sea followed by an additional six-mile exclusive fishing zone failed to be
adopted at UNCLOS II by only one vote. LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 2, at 79.
40. See LOSC, supra note 2.
41. See supra note 2.
42. The four Geneva Conventions, however, remain binding on the states that have
ratified them, but have not ratified the LOSC. Also, those parts of the LOSC that are
recognized as customary international law apply to all states.
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B. High Seas
One of the central parts of the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia
concerns access to the high seas. Although the concept of the high seas is
probably the least controversial in the area of maritime law, the peculiari-
ties of this dispute warrant a brief discussion of the basic rules applicable
to the high seas. Primarily, the high seas are defined as "all parts of the sea
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea
or in the internal waters of a State. . . ,,4 All states enjoy almost unre-
stricted rights on the high seas, including the freedom of navigation,
freedom of overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables, freedom to
construct artificial islands and other installations, freedom of fishing, and
freedom to conduct scientific research." The only restrictions pertain to
such issues as preservation of ocean resources, piracy, drug trafficking,
shipping of slaves, or unauthorized broadcasting,45 and no state may
exercise its sovereignty over any areas of the high seas." Hence, the high
seas represent a relatively unregulated area where only the flag state may
exercise sovereignty over a ship, except in the aforementioned limited
circumstances.
C. Territorial Sea
The LOSC established the right of states to claim territorial seas of up
to twelve nautical miles,47 but left unchanged the language of the Territorial
Sea Convention that the waters of opposite or adjacent states must be
delimited so that no state may claim any part of the territorial sea that is
closer to the coast of another state than to its own, absent "historic title or
other special circumstances," or an agreement between them. 4 Before
anything can be said about the delimitation of territorial sea, however, the
term itself and its implications must first be defined.
43. LOSC, supra note 2. art. 86.
44. Id. art. 87(1).
45. See generally id. Part VII.
46. Id. art. 89.
47. Id. art. 3.
48. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the
two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial
sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.
The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title
or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which
is at variance therewith. Id. art. 15. For almost identical language, see the Territorial Sea
Convention, supra note 37, art. 12.
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i.) Definition
The LOSC defines territorial sea as the belt of sea adjacent to the land
territory of a coastal state, over which the sovereignty of such a state
extends, 9 including the sovereignty over "the air space over the territorial
sea as well as to its bed and subsoil."5 The territorial sea may not extend
beyond twelve nautical miles from the baselines,"' and its outer limit is "the
line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the
baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea."52 The normal baseline
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along
the coast.5 3 In the case of territories with reefs, the baseline is the seaward
low-water line of the reef,' and in cases of "deeply indented and cut into"
coastlines, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast and in its
immediate vicinity, "straight baselines joining appropriate points" may be
employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured. 5
ii.) Rights of Third States in a Coastal State's Territorial Sea
A coastal state's sovereignty over its territorial sea notwithstanding,
ships of all other states enjoy the right of "innocent passage" through that
sea.56 This right of third states in another state's territorial sea, however,
is the only exception to the coastal state's sovereignty over these waters.
All other sovereignty rights that apply on the state's land territory are
preserved. Ships belonging to third states are not allowed to fish, lay
submarine cables, conduct research, exercises, or any other activity in
another state's territorial sea. Furthermore, coastal states retain full
sovereignty over the air space above their territorial seas, so no over-flight
rights exists for the airplanes of third states.
As far as the meaning of "passage" is concerned, potential for
uncertainty is low. The LOSC defines passage as navigation through the
territorial sea in order to traverse that sea,57 or in order to enter the internal
49. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
50. Id. art. 2(2).
51 Id. art. 3.
52. Id. art. 4.
53. Id. art. 5.
54. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 6.
55. Id. art. 7. For rules on drawing straight baselines, see generally art. 7.
56. Id. art. 17. (applying to ships of all states, whether coastal or landlocked).
57. Id. art. 18(l)(a).
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waters or ports of the coastal state.58 Passage must be "continuous and
expeditious,"59 although it can include stopping and anchoring that is
"incidental to ordinary navigation," or is caused by "'force majeure or
distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance" to others in distress.'
As for the meaning of "innocent" passage, the general terms of the
Territorial Sea Convention that "[plassage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State"61 was
preserved in the LOSC.62 However, the LOSC included additional detailed
provisions in order to define the acts that are so "prejudicial." 63 The list
includes weapons practice, spying, propaganda, launching or taking on
board aircraft or military devices, embarking or disembarking persons or
goods contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation regulations
of the coastal state, willful and serious pollution, fishing, research,
interference with coastal communication or other facilities of the coastal
state,64 but also "any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.''65 Included in a separate provision, but related to the concept of
innocent passage, the rights of submarines to traverse territorial sea is
contingent upon their navigation on the surface and display of the flag.'
It should be noted, however, that nothing in the Convention discriminates
against warships with regard to the right of innocent passage.
iii.) Rights and Responsibilities of a Coastal State in its Territorial Sea
Primarily, the coastal state may adopt laws and regulations relating to
innocent passage through territorial sea in respect of: the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; the protection of
navigational and other facilities; the protection of cables and pipelines; the
conservation of living resources; the prevention of infringement of fisheries
laws; the preservation of the environment; marine scientific research and
hydrographic surveys; and the prevention of infringement of the customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws. 67 Such laws and regulations must be
58. Id. art. 18(1)(b).
59. LOSC, supra note 2, art 18(2).
60. Id.
61. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 37, art. 14(4).
62 LOSC, supra note 2, art. 19(1).
63. I. art. 19(2).
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 20.
67. Id. art. 21(1).
Stormy Waters on the Way to the High Seas
in conformity with the Convention," and all foreign ships must comply
with them.69
If necessary for the safety of navigation, the coastal state may also
require foreign ships to use designated sea lanes while engaging in innocent
passage,70 particularly with respect to "tankers, nuclear-powered ships and
ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances.
7. M The coastal State may not, however, "impose requirements on
foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the
right of innocent passage, ' or "discriminate in form or in fact against the
ships of any State or against ships carrying cargo to, from or on behalf of
any State. '
73
The LOSC does allow coastal states to suspend innocent passage
through their territorial seas. 4 However, such suspension must be
temporary, it may occur only in specified areas, it must occur without
discrimination, formal or factual, among foreign ships, and it must be
essential for the coastal state's protection of its security, including weapons
exercises.75 Coastal states may not, however, impose any charges on
foreign ships by reason of their passage through territorial sea, except
insofar as any such charges are for specific services rendered.76
As for a coastal state's enforcementjurisdiction in its territorial sea, the
LOSC makes a distinction between criminal and civil jurisdiction.
Regarding the former, a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board a ship during the course of its passage in very limited
circumstances only.77 A coastal state may not, however, exercise criminal
jurisdiction over any crime71 that occurred prior to the ship's entry into the
state's territorial waters, unless the ship is either coming from its port or
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 21(4).
70. Id. art. 22(1).
71. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 22(2).
72. Id. art. 24(1)(a).
73. Id. art. 24(1)(b).
74. Id. art. 25(3).
75. Id.
76. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 26(1)&(2).
77. The consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state; the crime is of a kind to
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; the assistance has
been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic officer of the flag state; or such
measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking. Id. art. 27(1). These
limitations do not, however, apply when ships are passing through the territorial sea after
leaving the internal waters of the same coastal state.
78. Some exceptions relating to pollution and the EEZ are provided in Parts XII and
V of the Convention respectively. Id. art. 27(5).
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internal waters, or is on its way there.79 Regarding a coastal state's civil
jurisdiction, levying execution against or arresting a foreign ship for the
purpose of any civil proceedings is allowed only in connection with
obligations or liabilities incurred by the ship itself in the course of, or for
the purpose of its passage through the territorial sea, unless the ship is lying
in that sea or passing through it after leaving internal waters of the state
concerned.80
Finally, it must always be kept in mind that some breaches of a coastal
state's laws and regulations may result in loss of innocence, depriving the
foreign ship of its right to innocent passage, and allowing the coastal state
to "take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which
is not innocent."'" In such cases, the coastal state is entitled to arrest the
ship and institute proceedings before its courts, but a more convenient
alternative would be to simply exclude the ship from its territorial sea. 2
Emanating from this clause, but also well enshrined in international
practice, is the rule that ships not engaged in innocent passage, whether
because they are passing, or are passing but are not innocent, are subject to
all laws and regulations of the coastal state, and enforcement action may be
taken against them regardless of whether they have violated only those laws
and regulations that pertain to innocent passage, or any other laws and
regulations.83
Warships and other government-operated non-commercial ships,
however, are not subject to the coastal state's enforcement jurisdiction,
regardless of the circumstances due to the immunities that they enjoy under
customary international law. 4 They are, however, subject to the coastal
state's legislative jurisdiction pertaining to the passage through the
territorial sea. Hence, they are required to obey such laws, with their
immunity precluding only their enforcement, but a coastal state may require
any disobeying ships to "leave the territorial sea immediately. '8 5 Further,
the flag state of ships to which immunity applies is required to compensate
the coastal state for any damage caused as a result of non-compliance with
the coastal state's laws concerning innocent passage. 6 The right to self-
defense was not included in the LOSC, but this is a general right well
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 28(2)&(3).
81. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 25(1).
82. See LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 2, at 99.
83. Id. at 95.
84. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 32.
85. Id. art. 30.
86. Id. art. 31.
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recognized under international law, and coastal states facing imminent
attack are allowed to exercise it.
87
iv.) Delimitation of the Territorial Sea
Territorial sea delimitation, when compared to delimitation of the EEZ
or the continental shelf, appears to be a simple affair. Unlike the EEZ or
the shelf delimitation, which is governed by customary law as developed
by courts and based on the rule of equitable principles/equitable solution,"8
territorial sea delimitation is entirely governed by the equidistance/special
circumstances rule, contained in the LOSC.89 Hence, while there is a
common law for the purposes of the EEZ and the shelf delimitation, there
does not appear to be a common law for the delimitation of the territorial
sea.' ° Moreover, in delimiting the EEZ or the shelf, courts have reduced
the equidistance method to "just one among many,"9 with "no obligation
to use it or give it priority."92 In delimiting territorial sea, on the other
hand, the rule of equidistance does not apply only if there exist "historic
title or other special circumstances." '93
When carrying out delimitation of the territorial sea, the first issue that
must be considered is the legal title over those areas of the sea that are to
be delimited. For a state to exercise title over a particular area of the sea,
the state must primarily be a coastal state, as "[t]he land is the legal source
of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extension sea-
ward."' Furthermore, the legal link between a state's territorial sover-
eignty and its rights to certain maritime areas is established by "means of
its coast."' As a result, the coastline determines not only the existence of
maritime rights, but also their extent and their shape. Finally, critical to the
determination of title are the concepts of adjacency and distance.
87. See LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 2, at 99.
88. MARITIME DELIUrrATION, supra note 1, at 136.
89. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 15.
90. MARrrIME DELIDTATION, supra note 1, at 136.
91. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Third Party Settlement of the Maritime
Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 25 I.LM. 251, para. 102 (1986) [hereinafter
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award].
92. Id.
93. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 15.
94. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
para. 96 (Feb. 20). See also the Fisheries Case where the International Court of Justices, in
connection with the territorial sea, stated: "It is the land which confers upon the coastal
State a right to the waters off its coasts." Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 133
(Dec. 18).
95. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 49 (June 3).
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"[I]nternational law confers on the coastal State a legal title to ... a
maritime zone adjacent to its coasts, 96 and, for the purposes of territorial
sea, the legal title over this adjacent belt of sea can extend up to twelve
nautical miles.97
Only after the legal basis of a state's title to certain maritime areas has
been determined, can boundaries of those areas be set. Naturally, if there
were only one state, maritime areas adjacent to its coast could project as far
as it is allowed by international law, that is twelve miles for the territorial
sea,98 twenty-four miles for the contiguous zone,99 and two hundred miles
for the EEZ.' ° But when the coasts of two states are opposite or, espe-
cially, adjacent to each other, the maritime area that is adjacent to those
coasts must normally be divided despite the fact that one state would have
the legal title over all of it if the other state did not exist.''
That any division of territorial sea must be carried out according to the
equidistance and special circumstances rule, has already been noted. In the
case of maritime delimitation between Croatia and Slovenia, there is at
least a claim, if not a fact, that historic title and/or special circumstances
exist. If such a claim was absent, the dispute between these countries
would not exist either, as their territorial seas would then have to be divided
by applying the rule of equidistance. 0 2 It would be useful to provide a list
of all special circumstances that have been identified by courts, arbitral
bodies, or academics, but that any such list could not possibly pretend to be
exhaustive and authoritative within the scope or the purpose of this article.
Rather, it will be sufficient for the present purposes to analyze the
Croatian-Slovenian dispute in detail, and identify the special circumstances
that are either being claimed or may otherwise be present here, in order to
predict whether the territorial seas in question should be delimited by
following the method or equidistance, or whether the rule of historic title
and/or special circumstances should govern.
96. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 103 (Oct. 12).
97. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 3.
98. Id.
99. Id. art. 33(2).
100. Id. art. 57.
101. Id. art. 15. For an illustrative comment that "delimitation is a matter of amputating
the projections of two States by comparison with what each of them would be legally entitled
to if the other did not exist," see MArr[ME DELIMITATION, supra note 1, at 62.
102. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 15.
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IV. POSITIONS OF CROATIA AND SLOVENIA ON THE DELIMITATION
OF THEIR TERRITORIAL SEAS
A. Slovenia's Position
Slovenia's position regarding the territorial sea delimitation with
Croatia was most clearly stated in a Memorandum on the Bay of Piran,
adopted by the Slovenian Parliament in March 1993.103 The Memorandum
articulates two basic Slovenian demands: 1) "maintaining the unity of the
Bay of Piran under Slovenia's sovereignty and jurisdiction," and 2) "access
to the high seas based on the established criteria of international law and
respect for the specific situation of Slovenia."'" As far as the first demand
is concerned, the Memorandum declares that Slovenia considers the Bay of
Piran as "the case sui generis which demands strict respect for the historic
title and other special circumstances, and categorically rejects the use of the
equidistance method.""0 5 In support of this position, the Memorandum de-
clares that Slovenia exercised jurisdiction in the Bay of Piran during the
life of the former Yugoslavia, that such state of affairs existed at the time
of the two republics' independence, and that Slovenia also exercised
economic rights in the Bay, as well as "cared for its biological balance and
ecological protection."'' 6 Finally, the Memorandum claims that the Bay of
Piran "historically belonged to the Piran Municipality,"' 7 and that its
resources were under the "exclusive use of the population" of this
municipality, and that of the entire area of the Bay only the Slovenian side
was ever populated."
As for the second Slovenian demand, the Memorandum states that
"considering the specificity of the situation, it is necessary to respect the
principle of equity and, with that, the so-called special circumstances,
articulated in Article 12 of the Territorial Sea Convention."" °9  The
103. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 953 (citing the Croatian translation of the
Memorandum).
104. Id. at 954 (reprinting a portion of the Croatian translation of the Memorandum).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Piran Municipality is based in the Slovenian town of Piran, and it
encompasses only the Slovenian territory.
108. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 954 (reprinting a portion of the Croatian translation
of the Memorandum).
109. Id. Two issues are peculiar regarding this statement. Primarily, it is unclear why
Slovenia cites the Territorial Sea Convention, as opposed to the LOSC to which it is also a
party. However, considering that art. 12 of the Territorial Sea Convention is identical to art.
15 of the LOSC, this issue is of little importance. More peculiar is the fact that the
Memorandum cites "the principle of equity" which is contained neither in the Territorial Sea
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Memorandum further states that Slovenia is to be considered a
"geographically-disadvantaged state" which cannot declare its EEZ, "0 and
that the issue is crucial for "obtaining sufficient amounts of natural
resources for the survival of the Slovenian people.' Thereby, the
Memorandum continues, Slovenia believes it necessary, "in accordance
with the principle of equity and taking into account special circum-




Convention, nor in any of the LOSC provisions dealing with the territorial sea. Id.
I10. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. Here, the Memorandum again mentions the equitable principles which, as was
already pointed out in Part III and note 109 supra, do not factor into the matters of territorial
sea delimitation.
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would allow the territorial sea of Slovenia to, "at least in a narrow region,
touch upon the high seas in the Adriatic."' 3
Slovenia advanced two proposals to achieve the second demand." 4
According to the first, all of the waters in the Bay of Piran would constitute
Slovenia' s territorial sea, notwithstanding the fact that one coast of the Bay
undeniably belongs to Croatia. The boundary would then turn towards the
south-west from Cape Savudrija which is Croatia's northernmost point at
the entrance into the Bay, until it reached the high seas. All waters between
this line and the inherited Yugoslav-Italian territorial sea boundary would
constitute Slovenia's territorial sea. 5 The second proposal is far less
radical. It envisions a boundary line going through the Bay of Piran," 6
continuing in the same north-west direction toward the inherited Yugoslav-
Italian territorial sea boundary, and then turning towards the south-west
until it reaches the high seas." 7 In addition, the proposal would leave for
Croatia a triangle-shaped territorial sea "enclave" which would border the
Italian territorial sea on one side, and that of Slovenia on the other."' This
proposal would have the effect of creating a "corridor-like" portion of
Slovenia's territorial sea which would extend to the high seas.
B. Croatia's Position
Croatia outlined its position in 1999 through the Declaration on the
State of Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the
Republic of Slovenia." 9 Croatia's position, to be sure, is very simple when
compared to that of Slovenia. It declares that due to the fact that both
Croatia and Slovenia are parties to the LOSC, Croatian representatives,
such as the Government and the State Committee for Borders, are obligated
to advance positions in accordance with the Convention, that is, to insist
that the maritime boundary line in the Bay of Piran be determined
113. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 954-55.
114. Id. at 956.
115. See Map Exhibit B. Reproduced with the permission ofZbornik Pravnog Fakulteta
u Zagrebu (© Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu, 2001).
116. It is unclear from this proposal where exactly the boundary in the Bay of Piran
would lie. It is evident that it would not go through the middle of the Bay, and it appears
that it would leave some waters in the Bay to Croatia. See Map Exhibit B.
117. See Map Exhibit B.
118. Id.
119. Deklaracija o stanju medhdr avnih odnosa Republike Hrvatske i Republike
Slovenije [Declaration on the State of Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Croatia
and the Republic of Slovenia], 32 NARODNE NOVNE 1089-90 (1999), reprinted in
Delimitation, supra note 12, at 957 [hereinafter Declaration).
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following the rule of equidistance. 2 The Declaration further states that
until the boundary is established, the coastal states are "obligated to refrain
from exercising any type ofjurisdiction beyond the line of equidistance,"' 12'
and that the Croatian government is authorized to seek an advisory opinion
from international institutions if the dispute is not resolved within twelve
months.
22
C. The Prime Ministers' Agreement: Initials Only
After several years of negotiations that began on the basis of the
Slovenian Memorandum and the Croatian Declaration, the Prime Ministers
of the two countries reached an agreement on their maritime boundary in
July 200 1.123 The Agreement is in many ways a compromise between the
positions contained in the Memorandum and the Declaration respectively,
but is nonetheless much closer to Slovenia's positions than those of
Croatia. Specifically, the Agreement declares that the boundary in the Bay
of Piran shall begin at the river Dragonja's outlet into the Bay (Point A),
and continue in a straight line to Point B, located at the Bay's entrance,
three-quarters of the distance between the northernmost points of Cape
Savudrija'24 and Cape Madona,' 2 measured from the northernmost point of
120. Id. The Croatian Parliament's Declaration only mentions the border in the Bay of
Piran, but not further in the Bay of Trieste. It seems implicit, however, that the position was
that the entire boundary between Croatia and Slovenia should be determined using the rule
of equidistance, since such a rule would allow the boundary to simply continue its course
even after it leaves the Bay of Piran. See also Map Exhibit B for the illustration of the
Croatian proposal. Moreover, a thorough examination of the Croatian press shows that
Croatia's representatives and the media almost exclusively refer to the entire area in question
as "the Bay of Piran," probably for reasons of simplicity. Also somewhat unclear is the
Declaration's statement that the rule of equidistance is contained in "article 2" of the LOSC,
see Declaration, supra note 119. The said provision is, in fact, contained in art. 15. Perhaps
this is simply a lapsus calami considering that art. 15 is contained in Part II of the LOSC.
See LOSC, supra note 2, Part II. On the other hand, art. 2, which defines the territorial sea
and its breadth, is also contained in Part II. See id. Hence, this may indicate some lack of
familiarity with the LOSC on the part of the Croatian deputies.
121. Declaration, supra note 119.
122. Id. The Declaration specifically allows the Government to seek an advisory opinion
"from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, or from another
appropriate institution." Id.
123. See Agreement, supra note 9.
124. Point Savudrija is on the Croatian coast bordering the Bay of Piran.
125. Point Madona is on the opposite side of the Bay, on the Slovenian coast.
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Map Exhibit C
Cape Savudrij a. 126 From this point, the boundary line shall turn to the west
and continue in a straight line to Point C, which lies on the territorial sea
boundary established between Italy and the former Yugoslavia, 127 "except
in the area where the territorial sea of Slovenia is adjacent to the high seas"
(between the points Cl and C2 on the Point B to Point C line). 128 With
respect to this last provision, the agreement stipulates that the two countries
agree to create a high seas corridor between Slovenia's territorial sea and
the currently-established high seas, noting that "the sea area demarcated by
points Cl, C2, T5, and T6 constitutes the high seas."' 129 Finally, the
Agreement creates a small triangle patch of Croatian territorial sea
bordering the territorial sea of Italy, stating that "the sea area demarcated
by points C, C2 and T5 constitutes the Croatian territorial sea."' 30 Hence,
the boundary line outside of the Bay of Piran is basically divided into three
parts: the first part being the boundary between the Slovenian and Croatian
territorial seas, the second part constituting the border between Slovenia' s
126. See Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3(1) and map app. I (included as Map Exhibit C).
127. Id.
128. See id. art. 3(1).
129. See id. art. 4(1) and map app. I (included as Map Exhibit C).
130. See id. art. 5(1) and map app. I (included as Map Exhibit C).
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territorial sea and the high seas, and the third again being the border
between the territorial seas of the two states.
Reduced to the basics, the practical effects of the Agreement are as
follows:
The method of equidistance is not employed at all. Slovenia receives
as its territorial sea approximately eighty percent of the Bay of Piran 3' and
a substantial portion of waters outside of the Bay. 32 In total, Slovenia's
territorial sea under the Agreement is around 113 square kilometers larger
than it would be if the method of equidistance were to be employed.'33
Furthermore, the Agreement establishes a 3.6 kilometer by 12 kilometer"3
"high-seas corridor," bordered by the Slovenian territorial waters in the
north and the high seas in the south-west. 3 5 The eastern side of the
corridor is bordered by the Croatian territorial sea, and Croatia also retains
a "triangle" of territorial sea which is squeezed between the corridor in the
east, the Italian territorial sea in the west, the Slovenian territorial sea in the
north, and barely touching the high seas in the south. 36 The Agreement
finally stipulates that it must be ratified by the two countries' parliaments
before it can enter into force. Almost a year after it was initialed, however,
the Agreement does not appear to have a chance to receive a two-thirds
majority of the Croatian Parliament, and the Croatian media has noted on
more than one occasion that the Parliament "does not even want to
seriously discuss the Agreement."' 37 The Croatian deputies' approach is
131. RFE/RL, Slovenia and Croatia Reach Border Agreement, 5 BALKAN REPORT 54,
Aug. 3, 2001, available athttp://www.rferl.orgbalkan-report/2001108/54-030801.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003).
132. See Map Exhibit C.
133. See Goran Vojkovid, Sporazum sa Slovenijom iz 2001 [Agreement with Slovenia
from 2001], available at http://www.lawofthesea.net/parafirani_sporazurn2001.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003).
134. See RFEIRL, supra note 131.
135. See Map Exhibit C.
136. See Agreement, supra note 9, art. 4(1) and map app. I (included as Map Exhibit C).
Maintaining the territorial sea boundary with Italy was important to Croatia for two reasons.
Primarily, that boundary was established between Italy and the former Yugoslavia through
the Treaty of Osimo, which Croatia succeeded to, and Croatia did not want to jeopardize its
rights under that Treaty by ignoring one of its provisions, that is by removing its territorial
sea boundary with Italy. Also, Croatia's territorial sea boundary with Italy is at present its
only boundary with a European Union country, and this fact carries symbolic, but also some
tangible strategic and political connotations.
137. See, e.g., Marko Barigid, Jesu li mogud i dodatni pregovori o granicama i
nuklearki? [Are Additional Negotiations on Boundaries and the Nuclear Plant Possible?],
VJESNIK, Feb. 17, 2002, at 5 [hereinafterAre Additional Negotiations Possible?]. Also, as
already noted, the Croatian government has now signaled that, faced with the opposition in
Parliament, it will most likely abandon the Agreement and present Croatia's new negotiating
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not overly surprising. It is not only the appearance of the relative advan-
tage gained by Slovenia that is troubling to them, but it is also the media
coverage of the issue and the resulting public outcry that have made
ratification a risky political move at best. There is a general perception in
Croatia, among the public and in the Parliament, that the Government was
primarily motivated by political and economic considerations, rather than
by concern for preserving Croatia's territorial sea.
Such perception, to be sure, is not entirely without merit. Primarily, the
Croatian Prime Minister, in commenting on the Agreement, has noted that
Croatia's aspirations to join the European Union and NATO cannot be
fulfilled as long as unresolved territorial disputes with the neighboring
states persist.138 Moreover, he also noted, one week prior to initialing the
Agreement, that "Slovenia is situated on the road from Croatia to Europe,
literally and figuratively."' 39  More problematic than these rational
calculations, however, were various speculations in the Croatian media and
by the opposition that the Government "traded" the territorial sea for
Slovenia's promises to return the savings of Croatia's citizens left in the
Slovenian banks upon the break-up of Yugoslavia,"4 to build roads leading
to the Croatian borders,' 4' or to make some compromises on the land
boundary' 42 and the issue of the jointly-owned nuclear power plant.
positions. The government has not yet formally adopted this approach, but the statement by
the Deputy Prime Minister that it "soon will" indicates that Croatia has probably rejected the
Agreement for all practical purposes. See New Negotiations, supra note 10, at 3.
138. Konferencijazaltampu Premijera lvice Radana [Prime Minster IvicaRadan's Press
Conference], Sep. 17, 2001, available at http:/Iwww.vlada.hrracan-press. 1O.html (on file
with OCUJ).
139. Frenki Laugi, Ribarska rtva [Fisherman Victim], SLOBODNADAIMACIJA, July 27,
2001, available at httpJ/www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20010727/kolumne.htm (on file with
OCLJ) [hereinafter Fisherman Victim].
140. See, e.g., Marko Barigi, Inflacija sporazuma koji uglavnom proizvode nove
nesporazmne [Inflation ofAgreements which Usually Create New Disagreements], VJESNIK,
Jan. 6, 2002, at 4 [hereinafter Inflation of Agreements]; Vinka Drezga, Spekulacije o
"trgovanju" sa Slovenijom nisu utemeijene [Speculations on "trade" with Slovenia are
Baseless], VJESNIK, July 1, 2001, at 6.
141. Inflation ofAgreements, supra note 140, at 4. This would increase the tourist flow
into Croatia.
142. Fueling the tensions was an article in the Slovene press that declared that the
Croatian Prime Minster promised to give Slovenia three villages in return for "300 meters
of sea" along the Croatian coast of the Bay of Piran. Particularly problematic for the
Croatian public is the fact that while it cannot be ascertained whether these three villages
belong to Croatia or Slovenia, Croatia appears to have a claim to them that is just as valid
as that of Slovenia (the villages were officially included into a Slovenian municipality, but
the judicial and law-making jurisdiction was exercised by Croatia). This caused the
sentiment that Croatia was giving Slovenia its territories to receive what already belongs to
it (the 300 meters, if not more, in the Bay of Piran). See Marko Barilid, Hrvatska ne mote
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While categorically denied by the government, and probably well-
exaggerated, these speculations nonetheless created a wave of anti-
Agreement feelings in Croatia.'" The lowest point, however, came
following the address of the Slovenian Foreign Minister to the Croatian
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, at which he spoke about the
division of the "Yugoslav sea," causing the Croatian Foreign Minister to
compare his views to those of Slobodan Milogevid. 4 ' The combination of
all of these developments was probably what caused the Croatian govern-
ment to indicate that it would soon formally reject the Agreement by
forming new negotiating positions, and some have suggested that the issue
would remain dormant for at least five to six years absent a major
breakthrough." This prediction may well prove to be correct. Immedi-
ately following Croatia's Deputy Prime Minister's announcement that
Croatia would present its new position on the matter,1 47 the Slovenian
Foreign Ministry stated that "Slovenia's stance is clear and it will not be
changed. The agreement on boundary with Croatia was initialed and we
stand by this."'4 8 If such conflicting positions remain, Croatia and Slovenia
will likely soon revert to the deadlocked stage they were at prior to the
Agreement. Thus, the two countries should seek another mutually-
acceptable solution. Failure to do so will probably result in the resolution
of the dispute by a judicial or arbitral body, a course that both countries
would prefer to avoid. Accordingly, the analysis of the current agreement,
as well as of the possibility for alternative solutions, is discussed below.
trgovati teritorijama sa Slovenijom po naeelu "svoje za svoje" [Croatia Cannot Trade
Territories with Slovenia on the Principle "Ours for Ours"], VJESNIK June 16,
2001, at 3.
143. New Negotiations, supra note 10, at 3.
144. Especially damaging were the constant accusations by the opposition that the
Government "gave ours to receive what had already been ours." See, e.g., Ilija garid and
Gordana Dujic, Presedan pod maskom demokracije [Precedent under a Mask of Demo-
cracy], DOM I SviJET, Sep. 24, 2001, available at http:lwww.hic.hr/dom353/domO2.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2003). For accusations that Slovenia pressured Croatia into accepting
the Agreement by threatening to involve EU diplomats, see Inflation ofAgreements, supra
note 140, at 4.
145. Inflation of Agreements, supra note 140, at 4.
146. Are Additional Negotiations Possible? supra note 137, at 5.
147. New Negotiations, supra note 10, at 3.
148. Id. (quoting Nataga Prah, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Slovenia).
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V. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
A. Reverting to the Memorandum and the Declaration?
Despite of its shortcomings and wide rejection in Croatia, the
Agreement can certainly be considered as the first step on the way to
solving the maritime boundary between Croatia and Slovenia. It is, of
course, entirely possible that, should the dispute be taken to an international
judicial or arbitral body, the two countries will back away from the
positions set out in the Agreement, and adopt their previous positions, as
set out in the Slovenian Memorandum and the Croatian Declaration.
It is not, however, entirely necessary to analyze those positions in
detail, for several reasons. Primarily, Slovenia's pre-Agreement positions
that all of the waters in the Piran Bay should be declared its territorial sea,
and that its territorial sea should stretch all the way to the currently-
established high seas are probably unsustainable under international law.
As for the Bay of Piran question, it is very unlikely that any judicial or
arbitral body would deliver an award that would have the effect of
extending Slovenia' s jurisdiction all the way to the Croatian beaches on the
opposite coast.'49 Regarding the second issue, both of the Slovenian
proposals that are based on the Memorandum appear clearly unsustainable
under international law for one simple reason: the currently-established
high seas are more than fourteen nautical miles away from the closest point
on the Slovenian coast."5 Hence, Slovenia's proposals to extend its
territorial sea all the way to the point where it would be adjacent to the
current high seas is contrary to the LOSC which unequivocally declares
that the territorial seas may not extend further than twelve nautical miles
from the baselines.'5  Slovenia's government and negotiators most likely
understand these limitations that international law dictates, which perhaps
was one of the reasons why they departed from the Memorandum in the
Agreement with Croatia.
The second reason why Slovenia is unlikely to revert to the positions
contained in the Memorandum is that its government and the public are
more than satisfied with the Agreement,'52 so there is little reason to insist
149. For the discussion of historic title and special circumstances, see Part V(B) infra.
150. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 959. Slovenia does not have, and in all likelihood
cannot claim, any baselines that would extend the line from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.
151. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 3. Again, the normal baselines, that is, the low water line
along the coast will probably have to be used, as Slovenia could not claim any other
baselines. See id. art. 5.
152. For the discussion of how favorably the Slovene fishermen look upon the
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on the more stringent Memorandum demands, especially in light of its
deficiencies under international law. Whether Croatia will adopt the
position from its Parliament's Declaration, however, is an entirely different
question. Almost no one in Croatia, apart from the Prime Minister Radan' s
Government immediately following the initialing, has offered any praise for
the Agreement, causing an atmosphere that almost dictates that any
argument before a third body be concentrated on the demands that the line
of equidistance be used.'53 Moreover, it is questionable whether any
independent body decision could possibly be less beneficial than the
Agreement for Croatia, which may motivate Croatian representatives to
argue for the best solution possible - that is for the line of equidistance. '
The merits of any such approach will be considered along with analyzing
the Agreement's relation to international law.
B. The Agreement and International Law
i.) Legality of the Negotiated Agreement
It is undisputed that maritime delimitation has an international
character, and that its validity must be appraised in terms of international
law."'55 This rule notwithstanding, governments can, if they so desire,
depart from legal considerations and adopt any boundary line that is
agreeable to them. Indeed, the ICJ has declared that "it is well understood
that, in practice, rules of international law can, by agreement, be derogated
Agreement, see Fisherman Victim, supra note 139. Also, for the Slovenian Government's
praise of the Agreement, see Slovene Press Agency, Press Release: Slovene and Croatian
Governments Pass DraftAgreements on State Border and N-Plant, July 20,2001, available
at http://www.uvi.silenglnew/pressldatalpress/2001-07-20_2001-07-20-094308.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
153. Indeed, as noted supra, only condemnation of the Agreement has emanated from
the Parliament, the press, public, and noted academics. For a veiled opposition to any line
other than equidistance, see the interview with Croatia's foremost international law expert,
Vladimir Ibler, in Mihailo Nidota, Popusti li Hrvatska na moru, izgubit & i dio istarskog
kopna [Should Croatia Acquiesce on the Sea, it will Lose a Portion of the Istrian Land],
VJESNIK, June 6, 1999, at 5, available at http://www.vjesnik.comn/htnl/1999/06I06/Clanak.
asp?r=-unu&c=4 (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Professor Ibler argues that should Croatia "give
in" to Slovenian demands, it would risk loosing its land territory bordering the Bay of Piran.
Id. While this argument has little merit, it has created fears among the public, and thereby
the politicians.
154. By "beneficial" and the "best solution," it is solely the boundary issue that is
considered here. That is, no other considerations such as economic, EU relations, etc. are
given weight considering that they would probably not matter extensively unless a negotiated
solution is reached.
155. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 118 (Dec. 18).
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from. .. Hence, states enjoy complete contractual freedom in making
boundary agreements between them. For that purpose, they may choose
any delimitation method they wish, a combination of methods, or no
method at all, but simply draw a boundary that is most satisfactory to both
of them. Indeed, a number of negotiated boundary agreements are silent as
to the methods employed, emphasizing only the joint desire of the parties
to reach an agreeable solution.
Moreover, when international judicial bodies are asked to provide
advisory opinions, or even when courts issue rulings, states are at liberty to
disregard such advice or decisions in their subsequent negotiations. For
example, the agreements concluded between Germany and its neighbors
following the ICJ's North Sea judgment rest primarily on economic and
convenience considerations not connected to the Court's legal guidelines.'57
The Court has indeed upheld states' rights to depart from its decisions,
declaring that "they may... still reach mutual agreement upon a delimita-
tion that does not correspond to the decision,"' 58 and that "their accord will
constitute an instrument superseding their Special Agreement."'"59
Hence, the validity of the Croatian-Slovenian Agreement cannot be
questioned under international law. This, however, does not at all indicate
that a judicial or arbitral body is bound by this, or any other, agreement in
any way. On the contrary, such bodies must maintain the "objective legal
reasoning, ' ' "W and must apply "justice according to the rule of law,''
rather than "justice" as it may be viewed by negotiating states. Indeed,
states may take into their negotiations a number of factors unrelated to the
legal settlement of the dispute, such as political, economic, or any other,1
6 2
but "although there may be no legal limit to the considerations which States
may take account of, this can hardly be true for a court.... "'63 Hence, the
156. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
para. 59 (Feb. 20).
157. See MARrrMEDEMIUTATION, supra note 1, at 112-13.
158. Id. at 113 (quoting the Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment
of 24 February 1982, 1985 I.C.J. 219).
159. MARrruE DEUMrTATION, supra note 1, at 113. The parties were committed
through a Special Agreement to effect the delimitation in accordance with the rules handed
down by the Court, but later departed from those rules. Id.
160. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 91, at 294, para. 102.
161. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 48 (June
3).
162. This, indeed, may have been the case for the purposes of the Croatian-Slovenian
Agreement, at least if the some of the Croatian media accounts are correct, but also given the
statements by the Croatian government. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
163. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 48 (June
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legality of the negotiated Agreement notwithstanding, it is necessary to
analyze the legal implications of its provisions if the dispute were to be
presented to a judicial or an arbitral body.
ii.) Legality of the Agreement's Provisions when Determined by a
Third Body
It must be noted from the outset that several of the Agreement's
provisions are unprecedented, both as a matter of state practice and
international law. The question of the delimitation in the Bay of Piran
itself is not overly controversial, despite the fact that one state (Slovenia)
receives eighty-percent of its waters as its territorial sea. The real
controversy, however, emerges when the questions of the high seas
corridor, and especially Croatia's triangle of territorial sea not bordered
anywhere by its coast or any other part of its territorial sea, are considered.
Finally, the fact that Slovenia receives a substantial portion of waters for
its territorial sea, to which it would not be entitled to if the method of
equidistance were used, is not without controversy either. These three
issues will be considered in turn.
As for the Bay of Piran, it must be reiterated that, in territorial sea
delimitation, the line of equidistance should not be used when historic title
or other special circumstances dictate otherwise.' With regards to the
existence of special circumstances, Slovenia's claim that such circum-
stances exist, is not, to be sure, entirely without merit. Primarily, it is an
undisputed fact that it is only the Slovenian side of the Bay that has ever
been significantly populated, so the waters have been more extensively
used by the Slovenian population. 61 Moreover, it appears that in the last
years of the existence of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia' s police exercised
control over the entire Bay." This is not without significant importance
because the Badinter Commission, an arbitration commission for issues
emanating from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, including boundary issues,
decided that the principle of uti possidetis "applies to the republican
borders of Yugoslavia in the context of its current dissolution.', 67 Hence,
Croatia's claims that it exercised jurisdiction and control within the Bay up
164. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 15.
165. See Fisherman Victim, supra note 139.
166. Marija Pulid, Treba li Sabor poduprijeti ugovor o razgranidenju sa Slovenijom?
[Should the Parliament Support the Delimitation Agreement with Slovenia?], ARENA, Aug.
2, 2001, available at http://www.franic.info/arena_20010802.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2003).
167. Badinter Commission Opinion 3, reprinted in 3 EUR.J.INT'LL. 182, 184-85 (1992).
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to the line of equidistance for much of the life of the Yugoslav federation
may not be as important as the fact that Slovenia's control over the entire
Bay may have been present in the years leading up to the independence of
the two republics. 168
Whether special circumstances warranting a departure from the
equidistance method indeed existed is, hence, a factual question, and
cannot be answered with certainty in this article. It is sufficient to state that
there is at least a potential that such circumstances existed, and that
Slovenia may be entitled to some portion of the Bay beyond the line of
equidistance, although it is questionable whether any such special
circumstances demand that as much as eighty percent of the Bay's waters
are awarded to Slovenia.
With respect to historic title of the Bay, Slovenia's claim stands on
weaker grounds. The LOSC defines the status of bays, but its relevant
provisions apply "only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single
State," 69 and also do not apply to "so-called "historic" bays."'"0 As a
result, Slovenia may depart from the LOSC, arguing that the Bay of Piran
should be declared a "historic bay," a designation which could allow it to
claim all of its waters. Any such argument, however, possesses little merit.
The U.N. General Assembly prepared a Memorandum on historic bays, 7'
which states that in order for a bay to have a "historic" status, a state must
effectively and continuously maintain its sovereignty for a significant
period of time, that the state officially made a "historic bay" claim, that it
is evident from the practice of other states that they have accepted this
designation, and that the entire coast surrounding the bay belongs to only
one country.'7 2 Considering that all of the requirements must be met for a
bay to be declared historic,"' the mere fact that the coasts of the Bay of
Piran belong to two states indicates that Slovenia's position that the Bay
should be considered a historic bay is probably unattainable. Again, this
168. On the other hand, a documentary video filmed by a Serbian television station in
1988, three years prior to the demise of Yugoslavia, shows a Slovenian police officer explain
to a Yugoslav Army officer (also of Slovenian nationality) that an Italian fishing boat must
be towed to Umag (on the Croatian coast), and not to Piran (on the Slovenian side) because
it was caught fishing "in the Croatian territorial waters" within the Bay. See Delimitation,
supra note 12, at 965-66 (quoting the conversation from Videozapis televizije Novi Sad
namijenjen eegkoj nacionalnoj manjini o uhieenju talijanskog ribarskog broda Pantera
Prima [Video of the Novi Sad Television Geared toward the Czech National Minority
Regarding the Arrest of the Italian Fishing Boat Pantera Prima], July 8, 1988.
169. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 10(1).
170. Id. art. 10(6).
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carries little importance in light of the fact that special circumstances may
exist that would allow Slovenia to claim a larger portion, if not the entire
Bay, and that Croatia is probably willing to accept a line other than that of
equidistance within the Bay of Piran itself.
The larger questions, however, loom when the issue of the corridor to
the high seas is analyzed. As was already noted, states are free to delimit
their territorial seas as they wish, so the declaration of one part of the sea
as the high seas is not invalid under international law, whether that decision
is based on considerations of giving another state access to the high seas,
or simply limiting the breadth of territorial sea. It is an entirely different
question, however, whether a judicial or arbitral body would make such a
determination.
To be sure, the practice of states indicates that corridors to the high
seas are not a novel concept, especially when their purpose is to grant to a
coastal state access to the high seas from its territorial sea which it would
not have if a line of equidistance were employed. So, for example, France
and Monaco concluded an agreement in 1984"' delimiting their territorial
seas in a way that provides Monaco with a corridor to the high seas. The
agreement came about because, after the territorial seas of the two coun-
tries were enlarged from three to twelve nautical miles, an equidistance line
would have resulted in cutting off the Monegasque territorial sea from the
high seas, as well as in converging boundary lines that intersect less than
twelve miles from Monaco. In order to avoid this scenario, the two
countries agreed to attribute to Monaco a full twelve mile corridor of
territorial sea, not following any particular method of delimitation, and a
further corridor of continental shelf, to which it would not have been
entitled either had the equidistance method been used.'75
174. Maritime Delimitation Agreement between the Government of His Most Serene
Highness the Prince of Monaco and the Government of the French Republic, Feb. 16, 1984,
Fr.-Monaco, reprinted in9 L.O.S. Bull. 58 (1987) [hereinafter France-Monaco Agreement].
175. Id. The method of delimitation, in fact, did not even use Monaco's coastline as the
base because, if it had, the corridor would have continued toward the Italian territorial sea,
and no access to the high seas would have been possible. Id. Equidistance was only used
in closing Monaco's continental shelf corridor, as the line that closes it is equidistant from
the coasts of Monaco and the French island of Corsica. Id. See also Map Exhibit D.
Reproduced with the permission of the American Society of International Law (© American
Society of International Law, 1993).
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This agreement was not unprecedented, however. The Gambia and
Senegal agreed in 1975176 to use the parallels of latitude instead of
equidistance in order to avoid the cut-off of The Gambian maritime area,
including its territorial sea, from the high seas. 177 The circumstances of this
agreement are very similar to those found in the France-Monaco case. Just
like Monaco, The Gambia is bordered by the sea on one side, and by
another country (Senegal) on the other three sides. The projections of the
Senegalese coast would, as a result, cut off The Gambia's maritime areas
from the high seas if the line of equidistance were used (although, unlike
with Monaco, The Gambia would have retained full twelve miles of
territorial sea). The agreement avoids this scenario by giving The Gambia
a corridor to the high seas.'
The existence of these precedents notwithstanding, three important
factors must be noted. Primarily, these precedents do not seem to have
been warranted by international law. Indeed, it has been noted that
Monaco's cut-off, as disadvantageous as it was, was not explicitly
176. Agreement between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, June 4, 1975, Gam.-
Sen., available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/ls085.pdf (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter The Gambia-Senegal Agreement].
177. Id. See also Map Exhibit E. Reproduced with the permission of the American
Society of International Law (© American Society of International Law, 1993).
178. The Agreement did not distinguish between different zones of jurisdiction, and
may, hence, be considered to have created an all-purpose boundary. No outer limit to the
boundaries is specified in the delimitation. Gambia-Senegal Agreement, supra note 176.
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prohibited by international law. '79 The second, and perhaps more important
factor, is that none of the sides to either of the agreements asserted rights
under international law, and all were instead motivated by desires to
strengthen and improve relations with their neighbors. For example, the
France-Monaco Agreement expressly mentions the "privileged relations of
friendship" existing between the two countries, and the French rappor-
teur stated before the French Senate that "because of the tight and
exceptional nature of the French-Monegasque relations, France has
accepted provisions that the rules of international law did not oblige it to
accept.'.' As for Gambia and Senegal, the two countries also avoided
international law claims, and were instead motivated by an effort to
establish and maintain favorable conditions for development and coopera-
tion between them.'82
Finally, the third factor is as important, if not more so, as the second.
Both Monaco and Gambia were bordered on three sides by another state,
France and Senegal respectively. This allowed for the agreements to grant
them corridors to the high seas without at the same time effecting cut-off
of the territorial seas of the other states. While both France and Senegal
lost portions of their maritime areas to which they would have been entitled
under the method of equidistance, they nonetheless retained an uninter-
rupted access to all of their remaining territorial seas directly from their
coasts.'83 Given the nature of the boundary between Croatia and Slovenia,
however, Slovenia cannot achieve a corridor to the high seas without either
cutting-off a portion of the Croatian territorial seas from its territorial seas
directly adjacent to its coast, or eliminating Croatia's territorial sea
boundary with Italy, something that Croatia is probably not willing to lose.
These two precedents, hence, should not be viewed in light of
international law, but rather in political and diplomatic terms. The question
that remains, then, is whether an international judicial or arbitral body
would reach the same or similar conclusion as that contained in the
Agreement between Croatia and Slovenia. The answer is difficult to
predict, but some light can be shed by examining the relevant principles.
Slovenia insists that the line of equidistance should not be used because
special circumstances exist that warrant a departure from that line.
179. JONATHAN CHARNEY AND LEWIS ALExANDER, INTERNATIONAL MARTIME
BOUNDARIES 1584 (Vol. 2, 1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES].
180. France-Monaco Agreement, supra note 174, preamble.
181. INTERNATIONAL MARrlIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 179, at 1582 (quoting the
Records of the meeting of the French Senate of June 26, 1985).
182. Gambia-Senegal Agreement, supra note 176, preamble.
183. See Map Exhibits D & E.
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Slovenia's argument, in short, is that the existence of special circumstances
dictates both the establishment of a corridor to the high seas, but also
enlargement of its territorial sea beyond what the country would be entitled
to if the equidistance method were employed. The rule of special
circumstances as it relates to territorial sea delimitation is probably among
the least developed in the body of international law of the sea. Not only
does the LOSC fail to provide any guidance as to what those special
circumstances may be," 4 but, due to the fact that it is seldom litigated or
arbitrated, the world of territorial sea delimitation has not produced any
substantial body of case law. This article does not attempt to offer a
contribution to the debate as to what kinds of circumstances warrant a
designation as "special" circumstances. Instead, only those circumstances
that pertain to the dispute at hand will be considered and analyzed, and a
conclusion will be reached as to whether they, in this particular context, do
indeed constitute "special circumstances."
As to Slovenia's desire to have an access to the high seas, the
arguments contained in the Memorandum indicate that the special
circumstances that warrant such a solution are the freedom to fish, the
freedom to navigate, and Slovenia's position as a geographically-disadvan-
taged state. 85 With respect to the first two issues, the Memorandum
declares that the:
access to the high seas would enable... Slovenia to continue an
uninterrupted exercise of its internationally-recognized right to fish
in the high seas in the Adriatic, and would prevent further fishing
incidents. This is the only way to enable... Slovenia to retain the
basis to exercise its right to communicate with the world, the right
which it always had, and which is one of the basic rights of every
sovereign state. 86
As previously noted, however, the right to fish on the high seas is a right
that is well established in international law, both its customary component,
but also as codified through the LOSC. 8 7 The exercise of this right does
184. The LOSC only declares that equidistance shall not be used when special
circumstances exist. See LOSC, supra note 2, art. 15.
185. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 954 (citing the Croatian translation of the
Memorandum). While it cannot be predicted what the official Slovenian position would be
in any arbitration or litigation, it must be reiterated that the Memorandum, having been
adopted by the Slovenian Parliament, is the most official articulation of the Slovenian
position to date.
186. Id. at 955 (citing the Croatian translation of the Memorandum).
187. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 87(1)(e).
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not depend on any corridor to the high seas, and all states, coastal and
landlocked,' enjoy the right to fish on the high seas. Hence, separation of
Slovenia's territorial sea from the high seas would not diminish Slovenia's
indubitable right to fish.
As far as access to the high seas and the related concept of freedom of
navigation are concerned, it has already been explained, and need not be
repeated here, that the ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial seas of other states." 9 It is true that coastal states
may regulate passage through their territorial seas, but only for limited
purposes and with no discrimination against the ships of any one state.
That Slovenian ships would have to abide by any such regulations while
traversing Croatia's territorial sea on their way to the high seas is a matter
of substantial concern, but probably does not rise to the level of special
circumstances under the international law of the sea. However, while
international law does not appear to mandate the establishment of a
corridor connecting Slovenia's territorial sea with the high seas for the
purposes of preserving Slovenia's fishing and navigational rights, Sloven-
ia's concerns cannot be lightly dismissed.
As far as the Memorandum's characterization of Slovenia as a
geographically-disadvantaged state is concerned, Slovenia undoubtedly
meets the definition of such states contained in the LOSC. " However, the
only rights that geographically-disadvantaged states may receive pertain
solely to the EEZ, and not to territorial seas or the high seas, especially
with respect to delimitation. Indeed, the LOSC grants these states only "the
right to participate... in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the
surplus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal
States of the same subregion or region."' 9 ' Again, no state bordering on the
Adriatic Sea has declared an EEZ in that sea, so the middle part of the
Adriatic continues to have the status of the high seas. 9 The only right that
Slovenia has under its status as a geographically-disadvantaged state
cannot, hence, be exercised in the Adriatic due to the absence of an EEZ of
any state there. Furthermore, it appears that no judicial or arbitral decision
188. Id. art. 87(1).
189. Id. art. 17.
190. "[G]eographically disadvantaged States" means coastal States, including States
bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical situation makes them
dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of
other States in the subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional
purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no
exclusive economic zones of their own. Id. art. 70(2).
191. Id. art. 70(l).
192. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 967.
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pertaining to the delimitation of the territorial sea has ever taken the
geographically-disadvantaged status into account when making a decision.
In light of the aforementioned analyses, it appears that a judicial or arbitral
body called upon to decide the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia would
probably not favor the creation of a corridor that would give Slovenia
access to the high seas, especially if any such corridor had the effect of
compartmentalizing a portion of Croatia's territorial sea into a triangle that
does not touch Croatia's coast or any other portion of its territorial sea.
Finally, the third issue regarding the Agreement stems from the fact
that Slovenia receives a substantial portion of territorial sea which it would
not be entitled to if the line of equidistance were used. What is especially
peculiar about this fact is that such enlargement of Slovenia' s territorial sea
is not even necessary for the establishment of a corridor, as any such
corridor could simply extend further north until it reached Slovenia's
territorial sea that Slovenia would receive following the method of
equidistance. Indeed, a map that would establish such an arrangement is
the only kind that could have been discovered in the Croatian media
immediately following the Agreement, 93 so the question remains as to
whether the Croatian Government purposefully provided a wrong map in
order to deflect even greater criticism."
This issue, however, is not as controversial as that of the corridor. It
can be argued that the principle of non-encroachment dictates that
equidistance not be used in the Bay of Trieste when delimiting Croatian
and Slovenian territorial seas. The principle of non-encroachment is well-
established in international law, and it aims to ensure that a delimitation
line does not have the effect of cutting-off one of the states from part of its
maritime projection. Or, in the words of the ICJ:
the use of the equidistance method would frequently cause areas
which are the natural prolongation or extension of the territory of
one State to be attributed to another when the configuration of the
latter's coast makes the equidistance line swing out laterally across
the former's coastal front, cutting it off from areas situated directly
before that front.'95
193. See Marko Barigic, 9to dobiva Hrvatska u zamjenu za odricanje od dijela svoga
teritorija [What does Croatia Receive in Return for Relinquishing a Part of its Territory],
VJESNiK, July 21, 2001, map, at 3.
194. It is, indeed, evident that the map appearing in the Croatian media is incorrect.
Primarily, Map Exhibit C depicts the official map appended to the Agreement. Furthermore,
by comparing the coordinates contained in the Agreement, it is evident that the map found
in the Croatian media sources does not correspond to those coordinates.
195. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
Stormy Waters on the Way to the High Seas
It is questionable whether the line of equidistance would have this effect on
Slovenia, but the argument can be made that such a line is situated directly
before at least a portion of its coast."9 This issue is also not overly
controversial because it involves a relatively small area which Croatia can
probably afford to cede to Slovenia in the interest of good neighborly
relations, and without a significant public opposition.
VI. BRIDGING THE GULF:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION
A. Potential Likelihood for a Diplomatic Settlement
In light of the preceding analysis, it can probably be argued that the
likelihood of an independent tribunal handing down an award as favorable
to Slovenia as the provisions of the Agreement, is very low. It should not
be assumed, however, that this conclusion will lead Croatia to submit the
dispute to a third body. While it may well be true that Croatia stands to
gain substantially in any such litigation or arbitration, those gains would
correspond to the territorial sea boundary only, and would not include any
political, economic, or other gains that may be obtained through an
agreement. Moreover, any dispute before a third body would be certain to
bring Croatia's relations with its probably most important neighbor to a
very low point indeed. Thus, potential for a negotiated settlement
continues to exist despite the fact that the Agreement in its current form
will probably not constitute such a settlement. While compromises must
be made by both sides, the interests of both states dictate that the dispute
be resolved amicably through negotiations. Indeed, Slovenia is probably
eager to avoid a mediated or litigated solution because the results of any
such solution would likely be detrimental to its primary interests, while
Croatia, although in a better position in terms of international law, needs
to preserve friendly and cooperative relations with Slovenia in order to
advance its European integration ambitions.
3, para. 44 (Feb. 20).
196. See Map Exhibit B. Any encroachment that may be present here, however, is not
nearly as evident as that which was present in the dispute between Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau. See Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 91.
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B. Gunboat or Fishing Boat Diplomacy?:
Defining the Two States' Objectives
In order for the two countries to reach an agreement, they must
acknowledge their mutual concerns, and take them into account when
presenting their respective positions. Reduced to the basics, the two
countries' primary objectives are as follows: In the Bay of Piran, Slovenia
is willing to forego its initial claim to the entire maritime area of the Bay,
but it refuses to accept the line of equidistance. As a result, Slovenia is
adamant about receiving at least eighty percent of the Bay's waters, and
this request can probably be accommodated considering the fact that
Croatia is willing to cede some area in the Bay beyond the line of equidis-
tance. As for the boundary line further in the Bay of Trieste, Slovenia
wishes to receive an additional patch of territorial sea to which it would not
be entitled if the line of equidistance were employed, but its overarching
objective is that its territorial seas touch upon the high seas "at least in a
narrow region. "'197
As for Croatia, its primary objectives are probably largely political,
economic and strategic in nature, and are secondary to the actual place of
the maritime boundary with Slovenia. Hence, Croatia is probably more
interested in achieving an amicable solution that is satisfactory to Slovenia,
which would lead to gains in other fields, than in preserving all of the rights
to which it is arguably entitled under the terms of the international law of
the sea. However, the political, economic, and strategic objectives that
Croatia hopes to achieve by offering concessions to Slovenia will be largely
frustrated if such concessions are not limited at least to a certain extent.
This is so because these objectives can be achieved only by striking a
careful balance between accommodating Slovenia's objectives on the one
hand, and taking into account Croatia's concerns on the other. Hence, any
solution must also take into account the political opposition in Croatia,
security concerns associated with relinquishing a portion of the territorial
sea so close to the Croatian coast, and the strategic issue of preserving
Croatia's territorial sea boundary with Italy.
Thus, in order to reach a solution that is satisfactory to both sides to the
dispute, the following recommendations are in order. Primarily, Croatia
should be sensitive to the Slovenian demands for an access to the high seas,
and the opposition politicians, as well as the media and the public should
understand their legitimacy, rather than continue to view them as unwar-
ranted concessions on Croatia's part. It is, indeed, debatable whether the
197. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 954-55 (citing the Croatian translation of the
Memorandum).
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Slovenian demands for a high seas corridor are exclusively grounded in
matters of convenience rather than tangible concerns. 98 It is technically
correct that fishing and navigational rights can be exercised almost as
effectively by traversing another country's territorial seas as by accessing
the high seas directly. However, countries enjoy significant sovereign
rights in their territorial seas, and it is at least possible that Croatia could
attempt, at some future point, to use those rights to the fullest extent, or
even abuse them at the expense of the Slovenian ships traversing Croatia's
territorial seas.' 99 The only recourse available to Slovenia in such a
situation would be costly, protracted, and uncertain proceedings against
Croatia before international legal institutions, causing Slovenia's fishing,
shipping, and other interests to suffer during any such period.
Enabling Slovenia to reach the high seas without traversing Croatia's
territorial seas, on the other hand, would entirely eliminate the possibilities
198. The importance of being able to reach the high seas without traversing the territorial
seas of other states cannot be dismissed as an issue of convenience, as opposed to a tangible
concern, in light of the relevant precedents and state practice. Monaco, for example, was
concerned about being able to reach the high seas without having to cross France's territorial
seas, despite the exceptionally friendly nature of relations between the two countries.
Moreover, much of the ongoing territorial dispute between Belize and Guatemala has
focused on the Guatemalan demands for access to the high seas. This factor even caused
Belize to limit the breadth of its territorial sea in the area bordering Guatemala to three
nautical miles in order to provide a framework for a definitive boundary solution with
Guatemala. See http://www.cdera.org/Countries/belize.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). See
also http://www.belize-guatemala.gov.bz/belize-position.html#2 (last visited Feb. 2,2003).
The difference between the Belize-Guatemala and the France-Monaco cases on the one hand,
and Croatia-Slovenia on the other, is that the latter case is considerably more difficult to
resolve if all of the major objectives of both states are to be met. The complexity of the
problem, however, does not indicate that Slovenia's demands for access to the high seas are
any less justified than those of Monaco or Guatemala.
199. The vague wording of the LOSC could allow Croatia to harass ships going to and
from Slovenia's ports by, for example, claiming that such ships are not engaged in passage,
see LOSC, supra note 2, art. 18, claiming that they are engaged in passage that is not
innocent, see id. arts. 19 & 25, or arresting a ship by using one or more LOSC arrest
authorizations, see id. arts. 27-28. Additionally, Croatia could order Slovenia's warships
to leave its territorial sea by claiming that they are not complying with Croatia's "laws and
regulations." See id. art. 30. Crotia's approach toward military vessels is particularly
troubling. As recently as 1998, the U.S. Navy conducted operational assertions in Croatia's
territorial sea, challenging Croatia's requirement that foreign military ships obtain
permission prior to entering its territorial sea See http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/
adr1999/apdx-i.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). Croatia is one of only thirteen countries
that made this clearly excessive claim, forcing the U.S. Navy to challenge it. Among the
other twelve states are such unsavory regimes as Yemen, Vietnam, Syria, Sudan, Somalia,
United Arab Emirates, and Iran. Id. Although the undemocratic rule of Croatia's President
Franjo Tudjman is now a thing of the past, this precedent helps to illustrate why Slovenia
is wary of having to traverse Croatia's territorial sea on the way to the high seas.
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for such abuses. Indeed, it is the potential for such abuses, not the
peripheral advantages, that has largely motivated Slovenia's calls for a high
seas corridor. One such peripheral advantage that a high seas corridor
would provide would be an additional patch of sea in which Slovenia's
fishermen could fish. Slovenia, however, probably does not even view this
as a considerable advantage, considering the fact that a corridor is meant
to be just that: portion of the sea used for navigation leading to and from
Slovenia's territorial seas. Moreover, the relatively small size of the
corridor minimizes this peripheral advantage even further. Although not
articulated by Slovenia, and understandably so, an additional factor that
must nonetheless be considered concerns the issues of sovereignty, national
pride, and a desire to be a full-fledged coastal state.2"° These are likely
among Slovenia's primary concerns, and while its ability to sail its
warships and submarines, or fly its airplanes in any way it desires2"' has
little practical effect in the region flanked by NATO and the EU countries,
symbolic effects of possessing such rights cannot be discounted.
As for Croatia's concerns, the public outcry over the Agreement
appearsjustified at least in some respects, particularly when it is considered
that international law appears to operate in favor of Croatia's original
positions. Perhaps the thorniest issues are the existence of a high seas
corridor and a small triangular patch of the Croatian territorial sea not
connected to the rest of Croatia's territorial waters. These concerns, to be
sure, cannot be dismissed. As for the corridor, the Agreement transforms
a portion of the Croatian territorial sea so close to the Croatian coast into
an area where the ships of all nations have almost unlimited rights,
including the right to fish, exploit submerged resources, erect research and
exploration platforms, conduct military exercises, etc.2"2 While it may be
the intention of both Croatia and Slovenia to treat the area in question
primarily as a corridor, they must understand that the international law will
200. Although never officially articulated as an overarching interest, this factor has very
often been emphasized by Slovenia's officials. For example, the Slovenian Prime Minister,
commenting on the Agreement shortly after it was initialed, stated that the Agreement
confirms Slovenia's "position as a maritime state . . . allowing it to reemphasize its
sovereignty, and to ensure additional stability and security." Mihailo Nidota, Slovenijaprvi
put dobiva izlaz na otvoreno more [Slovenia Gains Access to the High Seas for the First
Time], VJESNIK, July 21, 2001, at 3.
201. This cannot be done in or over the territorial sea of another country. See LOSC,
supra note 2, art. 17-20.
202. These scenarios are not very likely, to be sure, but the effect of their hypothetical
existence on a country's psyche cannot be discounted. Moreover, while the scenarios appear
unlikely at the moment, a change in geopolitical circumstances could make this high seas
corridor a very troublesome area for Croatia, but also for Italy, and even for Slovenia.
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view the area as the high seas first and the corridor second, at least as far
as third states are concerned.
Moreover, with respect to the triangle of Croatia's territorial sea, it is
very debatable whether Croatia could continue to exercise sovereign rights
over that area in the absence of recognition by other states. Indeed,
international law confers upon a coastal state "a legal title to a maritime
zone adjacent to its coasts. ',2 3 Moreover, the LOSC declares that "[tihe
sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal
waters... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."'  It
is, then, at least foreseeable that other countries would be entitled to ignore
Croatia's exercise of sovereignty in the triangle area, arguing that
international law does not recognize as territorial sea any waters which are
not adjacent to the coast. This could have the effect of extending the high
seas designation from the corridor into the triangle, at least for the purposes
of third states that might wish to extend such a designation.2 5 This
possibility is particularly likely when it is considered that, as best as can be
determined, there exists no precedent of a country claiming as territorial
seas waters that nowhere touch upon the rest of its territorial sea.
Naturally, this problem would not exist if the necessity for retaining
Croatia's territorial sea boundary with Italy could be addressed in some
other way. In such a case, the high seas corridor could simply be adjacent
to the Italian territorial sea, leaving the Croatian territorial sea as a
contiguous unit. That fact notwithstanding, it has been made abundantly
clear by Croatia's officials that they do not wish to even contemplate the
possibility of loosing the territorial sea boundary with Italy, both in order
to preserve its sole border with an EU country, but also in order to avoid
any potential usurpation of the Treaty of Osimo.'
203. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 103 (Oct. 12) (italics in original).
204. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
205. Slovenia, of course, would not be entitled to make such a claim because the
Agreement would preclude it from doing so. The Agreement, however, would be binding
on Croatia and Slovenia only, and would have no legal effect on other states that might, for
one reason or another, wish to usurp Croatia's claim to the triangle area.
206. While the desire to preserve a border with an EU state is largely motivated by
symbolic considerations, the usurpation of the Treaty of Osimo is a more tangible concern.
Were the high seas corridor to be adjacent to the Italian territorial sea, Italy could,
theoretically, declare the area its territorial sea because the corridor would lie less than
twelve nautical miles from its shores. In making such a claim, Italy could assert that Croatia
voluntarily relinquished its rights to the area as given to it by the Treaty of Osimo, and that
Italy was free to claim the area for itself, Croatia's and Slovenia's assertion that the corridor
constitutes the high seas notwithstanding.
2002]
62 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:21
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the boundary with Slovenia is not
Croatia's only remaining open boundary question, and any precedents that
are established within the context of negotiations with Slovenia may affect
the resolution of disputes with other Croatian neighbors. A very serious
and ongoing dispute exists with Serbia-Montenegro over the Prevlaka
peninsula, Croatia's southernmost point. The land boundary is not the only
source of the dispute, as the maritime boundary in this region will also need
to be determined. While the Croatian officials have strongly indicated that
any solution that is reached in the dispute with Slovenia will not have the
slightest bearing on the negotiations with Serbia-Montenegro over
Prevlaka,0 7 it is possible that the Serbian and Montenegrin officials might
fortify their positions with a hope that Croatia would be willing to offer
concessions similar to those that it agreed to within the context of the
dispute with Slovenia. While this possibility, admittedly, is relatively
small, the greater problem for the Croatian government concerns the very
likely possibility that the public and the opposition will react very strongly
against any compromises that might be made in the dispute with Serbia-
Montenegro, however slight such compromises may be, if the perception
remains that Croatia's interests were substantially hurt in the settlement
with Slovenia.
C. Striking the Middle Ground: The Adriatic Meets the EEZ
Considering the aforementioned limitations and considerations, and in
light of the fact that the Agreement is not likely to be ratified by at least one
of the parties, several recommendations for a negotiated solution of the
dispute are in order. Primarily, the boundary in the Bay of Piran should
probably not follow the equidistance line due to the special circumstances
created by the greater Slovenian use of and interests in the Bay, especially
considering the Bay's small size. To be sure, it is not only fishing and
other rights that Slovenia would exercise in the Bay, but would also bear
the responsibility for maintaining its biological and ecological balance,
something that can be done more effectively by a single country, especially
when such a country has more compelling interests than the other, and
when the size in question is so small. This does not mean that Slovenia
207. Shortly after the Agreement was initialed, Ivica Radan, Croatia's Prime Minister
answered a reporter's question as to whether the settlement with Slovenia might in any way
serve as a precedent in solving the dispute over Prevlaka by stating: "it cannot, I say that
categorically, hold me to my word." HRT Vijesti, Konferencija za novinare Premijera Ivice
Radana [Prime Minister Ivica Radan's Press Conference], July 25, 2001, available at
http:llwww.vlada.hr/racan-press.09.html (on file with OC.J).
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should be awarded the entire maritime area of the Bay, so that its sover-
eignty would extend to Croatia's beaches. Rather, the line from the
Agreement should either remain, or be slightly modified to address the
Croatian concerns that an eighty-twenty division is too drastic.
The additional territorial sea outside of the Bay of Piran that the
Agreement gave to Slovenia by deviating from the equidistance method
should be awarded to Slovenia in any subsequent negotiations, primarily in
order to satisfy the principle of non-encroachment, but also to take into
account the relatively small size of Slovenia's territorial sea and the needs
of its fishermen and population. As already noted, the additional territorial
sea that Slovenia so gains in the Bay of Trieste, to which it would not be
entitled if the line of equidistance were used, constitutes a relatively small
area, especially as far as Croatia is concerned.2 "8 Moreover, the opposition
to the Agreement in Croatia did not focus on the loss of this small patch of
sea, but was mostly directed towards the creation of the high seas corridor
and its implications for the "triangle" separated from the rest of Croatia's
territorial sea. With that in mind, those two thorny issues deserve special
attention.
With respect to the corridor, Croatia should understand Slovenia's
desire to have an access to the high seas, but Slovenia should also take into
account the dangers that creating the high seas in the middle of one
country's territorial seas connotes. Considering these two concerns, it
would seem natural to propose that Croatia should grant Slovenia an
easement, long term or even perpetual, to traverse Croatia's territorial sea
on the way to the high seas. It would not be difficult to word any such
easement agreement in a way that would provide Slovenia's ships, military
and civilian alike, with a right to use certain portions of Croatia's territorial
sea as if it was the high seas. Moreover, a comprehensive easement
agreement could easily extend such a right to any ships traversing Croatia's
territorial sea on the way to or from Slovenia's ports, thereby satisfying
Slovenia's objectives to have access to the high seas.
It must, however, be reiterated that Slovenia's primary and overarching
objective is not access, but rather a direct access to the high seas. For the
reasons already discussed, Slovenia is probably not willing to accept any
arrangement that would require it to pass through Croatia's territorial sea
on the way to the high seas, regardless of any special rights that an
easement agreement could confer. In fact, Croatia has offered such an
208. The area in question is not larger than 100 square kilometers. See supra note 133.
In contrast, the total area of Croatia's territorial sea is 23,870 square kilometers large. See
http://www.hr/hrvatska/geography.en.shtnfl (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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option to Slovenia during the negotiations,2' but the Slovenian officials
have been adamant in their demands that the territorial sea of Slovenia
should "at least in a narrow region touch upon the high seas in the Adri-
atic. "210 Indeed, it is not only the psychological concerns associated with
having direct access to the high seas that motivate such Slovenian
approach, but some tangible legal issues exist as well.2 ' Regardless of how
carefully any easement agreement may be worded, Croatia would continue
to exercise sovereign rights in its territorial sea for the purposes of
international law, the existence of an easement notwithstanding. Slovenia,
hence, would be entitled to very few protections in an easement area under
the relevant law of the sea conventions, and its rights would hence be
dependent on the continued observation of this hypothetical easement
agreement by Croatia. Moreover, a change in economic, political and
strategic circumstances could eventually motivate Croatia to erode the
rights that an easement might grant to Slovenia, or even to abrogate the
easement altogether.
As a result, and in order to satisfy both countries' primary objectives
and concerns, a compromise solution must be offered. While it is true that
Slovenia is adamant about receiving a direct access from its territorial
waters to the high seas, the practical side of this objective is that Slovenia
wishes to avoid having to traverse the territorial seas of another country as
its only way to the high seas. This, to be sure, is a tangible concern. As
already discussed, countries enjoy substantial sovereign rights in their
territorial waters, and other states are subject to considerable limitations
while using those waters, or, as importantly, the air space above them.
Croatia, on the other hand, is justifiably concerned about the connotations
that the creation of a high seas corridor so close to its shores would entail.
Hence, the middle ground between an easement in Croatia's territorial sea
and a high seas corridor running through that sea must be found.
Considering that the EEZ is usually the middle ground between the
territorial sea and the high seas, it is only appropriate that any middle-
ground solution involve that creation. Simply stated, the corridor
envisioned in the Agreement should be declared Croatia's EEZ, and the
triangle should remain its territorial sea. Before anything further can be
said, it must be reiterated that a less complicated solution simply does not
exist if all of the primary objectives and concerns of both states are to be
209. Are Additional Negotiations Possible? supra note 137, at 5.
210. Delimitation, supra note 12, at 954-55 (citing the Croatian translation of the
Memorandum). For Slovenia's refusal to accept Croatia's easement offers, see Are Addi-
tional Negotiations Possible? supra note 137, at 5.
211. See supra note 199.
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met. Without a corridor of some kind, Slovenia cannot reach the high seas
without traversing the territorial seas of Italy or Croatia. Unlike with the
Monaco-France and the Gambia-Senegal agreements, Croatia, if it wishes
to preserve a border with Italy, cannot maintain unity of its territorial sea.
Hence, both the corridor and the triangle remain the necessary components
of any potential settlement between Croatia and Slovenia, however
unprecedented and unorthodox the combination of these two creations may
be. Without such a combination, one of the states will be forced to
relinquish its main objectives, destroying the possibility for a mutually-
acceptable negotiated solution.
Once these factors are taken into account, it becomes readily apparent
that the only possibility for an agreement that would be satisfactory to both
states involves the creation of a corridor that would constitute Croatia's
EEZ, and that would run through the middle of Croatia's territorial sea. In
other words, the only major difference between this proposal and the
Agreement is that the high seas corridor envisioned in the Agreement
would instead be declared an EEZ belonging to Croatia. The triangle of
Croatia's territorial sea lying west of that corridor would remain in order
to preserve Croatia's territorial sea boundary with Italy. While it is true
that this proposal differs from the Agreement in only one respect, the
importance and value of that difference cannot be overemphasized. By
following this method, Croatia and Slovenia will ensure that both countries'
primary objectives and concerns are satisfied, allowing both of them to
view the solution as a full-fledged compromise that will not leave either
party with a feeling that it had compromised its national interests. As for
Croatia, not only will its border with Italy be preserved, but the proposal
ensures that third states are not given the possibility to engage in fishing,
research, mining, construction, and other activities incompatible with the
status of the EEZ212 so close to its coast. Slovenia, for its part, will enjoy
practically all of the navigational rights in this zone that it would enjoy if
the zone were to be considered the high seas.
213
Indeed, the legal regime that is applicable in the EEZ provides the
coastal states with very limited rights. Conversely, the rights of the third
states in this zone are substantial, and most of them cannot be abrogated by
the coastal state. Convenient to the dispute at hand is the fact that the
rights that coastal states have in their EEZs are sufficient to address
Croatia's major concerns, while the rights of the third states in this region
are broad enough to satisfy practically all of Slovenia's objectives. The
arrangement allows Slovenia to receive far more than it could probably
212. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 56.
213. Id. art. 58.
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hope for under arbitration or litigation, while it gives Croatia an opportu-
nity to resolve the dispute with its closest and strategically most important
neighbor in an amicable manner.
The LOSC defines the EEZ as "an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea." '214 The sovereign rights of a coastal state in the EEZ are
limited to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources,215 and
jurisdiction with regard to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial
islands, installations and structures, 26 (ii) marine scientific research,2"7 and
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 218 In
addition, the coastal state has the exclusive right to construct and to
authorize and regulate construction and use of artificial islands and other
installations in its EEZ.2" 9 The coastal state may carry out enforcement
measures, but only "in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the EEZ."22 This
includes rights to "determine the allowable catch of the living resources, ' 221
and jurisdiction over artificial islands or structures "with regard to customs,
fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations., 222 Unlike with
the territorial sea, however, the coastal state may not institute or enforce
any laws that do not pertain to these limited rights. Moreover, the coastal
state is not allowed to impose imprisonment, "or any other form of corporal
punishment," for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the EZ223
As for the rights of third states in the EEZ, they all enjoy the freedoms
of navigation and overflight, the freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines, as well as "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. ' 224 Hence, the only rights that
214. Id. art. 55. The implications of this provision for the legal status of the triangle will
be discussed infra.
215. Id. art. 56(1)(a). In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the
seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.
Id.
216. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 56(l)(b)(i).
217. Id. art. 56(l)(b)(ii).
218. Id. art. 56(l)(b)(iii).
219. Id. art. 60(1).
220. Id. art. 73(1).
221. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 61(1).
222. Id. art. 60(2).
223. Id. art. 73(3).
224. Id. art. 58(1).
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states enjoy on the high seas but not in the EEZ of another state involve
freedom to construct artificial islands, freedom to fish, and freedom of
scientific research.225 With respect to the corridor, however, the freedoms
associated with the EEZ are more than sufficient to satisfy all but the most
symbolic Slovenian objectives,2 6 while the absence from the EEZ of the
additional rights found on the high seas serves to protect not only Croatia's
interests, but those of Slovenia as well. As was already noted, the corridor
declared the high seas by the Agreement would, for purposes of interna-
tional law, and as far as third states are concerned, be seen primarily as the
high seas. Under LOSC, however, "no State may validly purport to subject
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty." '227 The Agreement between
Croatia and Slovenia notwithstanding, the ships of all nations would be free
to engage in almost any activity they desire,2" including unlimited fishing,
construction, research, and exploration, and there would be nothing that
either Croatia or Slovenia could do to stop them.
While it is true that Croatia, should the corridor be declared its EEZ,
will be free to engage in these activities itself, it is understood that any
effects that one country may produce would likely be far less harmful than
those produced by a number of countries, especially when the one country
in question is so close to the affected area and probably does not wish to
engage in any harmful activity.229 In fact, Croatia, by having the corridor
as its EEZ will be fully able to ensure that no such harmful activities are
carried out by third states. Moreover, while Croatia's rights in the EEZ
corridor proposed here can be easily restricted in reference to Slovenia by
the two countries through a comprehensive agreement on this dispute, the
225. id. Compare with the freedom of the high seas as defined in LOSC, supra note 2,
art. 87(1).
226. Perhaps having a direct access to the high seas is important for a country's psyche,
but, as will be shown, adequate mechanisms can be employed to ensure that only purely
symbolic, and no substantive, interests of Slovenia will suffer.
227. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 89.
228. Excluding such limited actions which are prohibited even on the high seas, such as
piracy, unauthorized broadcasting, slave trade, illicit drug trade, etc. Id. arts. 99-109.
229. For example, were Croatia to construct artificial islands or structures in this
corridor, it would be obligated to give "[d]ue notice ... of the construction," maintain "per-
manent means for giving warning of their presence .... establish reasonable safety zones
around such... installations," and "take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of
navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and structures." Id. art. 60. While
similar measures appear to apply for such installations on the high seas, these provisions are
far more ambiguous, and their enforcement would be significantly more difficult against
third states than it would be against the coastal state in its EEZ. See id. art. 87(d), (referring
to Part VI of the LOSC, art. 80, which declares that "[a]rticle 60 applies mutatis mutandis
to artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf." Id. art. 80).
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rights of third states in a high seas corridor cannot be limited through an
agreement between Croatia and Slovenia.
Indeed, Slovenia's argument that it is a geographically disadvantaged
state would carry full weight if the corridor were to be declared Croatia's
EEZ. The LOSC grants geographically disadvantaged states, which
Slovenia arguably is,23° "the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in
the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources
of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or
region."23' Moreover, the LOSC declares that "the terms and modalities of
such participation shall be established by the States concerned through
bilateral, subregional or regional agreements."2 2 While it may be shown
that the corridor area will yield no "surplus of the living resources, '233 the
LOSC, or international law, does not prevent two states to enter into an
agreement that would allow for the sharing of resources even absent any
such surplus.2 34 Hence, although it is not likely that the corridor would be
used for fishing, Croatia and Slovenia may, through a comprehensive
agreement, provide that both states will enjoy equal fishing, and perhaps
other 3' rights in this EEZ corridor. A practical result of such an agreement
would be to grant Slovenia all of the benefits in the corridor that its
designation as the high seas would allow, while at the same time allowing
Croatia to preclude third states from exercising such rights. The most
important Slovenian objectives, such as the freedoms of navigation and
overflight over the EEZ corridor, would, of course, be ensured even in the
absence of any additional specific arrangements.236
The only potential problem associated with the proposal raised here
concerns the legal status of the Croatian triangle of territorial sea in the
event that an EEZ corridor is created. As noted previously, the triangle,
necessary to preserve Croatia's territorial sea boundary with Italy, will be
separated from the rest of the Croatian territorial sea. The LOSC, again,
provides that territorial sea is a belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state's land
territory."' The EEZ, in turn, is defined as "an area beyond and adjacent
230. The LOSC defines geographically disadvantaged states as "coastal States... which
can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own." Id. art. 70(2).
231. Id. art. 70(1).
232. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 70(3).
233. Id. art. 70(1).
234. As already discussed, states enjoy complete contractual freedom when making
boundary agreements. See Part V(B)(i) supra.
235. Such as research, exploration, erection of artificial islands and structures, etc.
236. See LOSC, supra note 2, art. 58(1). This also includes freedom of laying submarine
cables and pipelines.
237. Id. art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
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to the territorial sea.,1 31 While it is evident that these provisions do not
contemplate an arrangement in which the territorial sea of a coastal state is
divided by a belt of the EEZ, it appears to be a much more credible claim
that a state has a right to preserve a divided belt of the territorial sea
adjacent to a zone over which it possesses some sovereign rights (e.g., the
EEZ) than to a zone where it has none (e.g., the high seas). To be sure,
there exists no precedent that could answer this question, but a fair reading
of the LOSC indicates that the arrangement is probably valid under
international law. Namely, the freedoms of states are practically unlimited
on the high seas, while they are subject to significant limitations in the EEZ
of another country. With that in mind, it can be argued that Croatia is
simply waiving some of its sovereign rights in the EEZ corridor, while
preserving all of them in the triangle area. Preserving the triangle as its
territorial sea, hence, is a significantly more valid exercise than if that
triangle were adjacent to an area where all of Croatia's rights have been
waived. Third states, hence, will certainly not be able to claim that the
triangle constitutes the high seas by extension from the corridor. At most,
they will be able to assert that the area constitutes the extension of
Croatia's EEZ, the potential for which is far smaller, and significantly less
problematic for Croatia.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dispute between Croatia and Slovenia over the territorial sea
boundary in the Bay of Piran and the Bay of Trieste has reached a new
level with the Croatian government's indication that it would likely reject
the Agreement and form new negotiating positions. Considering the
amount of opposition to the Agreement in Croatia, both by the public and
in the Parliament, this move was probably the only option that the
government had despite its desires to resolve the dispute in an amicable
manner and compensate the losses on the matter by gaining significant
advantages in its strategic relations with Slovenia. Nonetheless, Croatia is
probably not eager to seek a judicial or arbitral resolution of the dispute
because any gains that it might so achieve over the boundary question
would translate into serious losses produced by the souring of Croatian-
Slovenian relations. Slovenia, for its part, is fully satisfied with the
Agreement, but it probably knows that the Agreement cannot become
operational until it is ratified by the Croatian Parliament, a move that has
been unlikely from the moment the Agreement was initialed. Moreover,
Slovenia is similarly reluctant to seek a third body resolution because the
238. Id. art. 55.
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likelihood of any such body rendering a decision favorable to Slovenia is
very low considering the provisions of international law.
As a result, the two countries should continue to seek a negotiated
solution, but must, at the same time, take into account each other's primary
interests and concerns, and seek a compromise based on them. The most
satisfactory such compromise is an agreement that would grant Slovenia
sovereignty over the larger portion of the Bay of Piran, provide it with more
territorial sea further in the Bay of Trieste than it would be entitled to if the
line of equidistance were to be used, and create a corridor constituting
Croatia's EEZ, while leaving a triangle of Croatia's territorial sea beyond
that corridor in order to preserve Croatia's boundary with Italy. By
following this proposal, the two countries will achieve their major
objectives, that is, Slovenia will have unlimited freedoms of navigation and
overflight on the way to the high seas, while Croatia will preserve its
territorial sea border with Italy and alleviate the concerns that the creation
of a high seas corridor so close to its coast connotes. Moreover, Croatia
and Slovenia may create an agreement sufficiently comprehensive to ensure
that Slovenia would enjoy the freedoms in Croatia's EEZ corridor that are
normally associated with the status of the high seas, by granting Slovenia
fishing, research and other rights in this corridor, while at the same time
ensuring that no such rights are accessible to third states. Considering the
geographical features of the area in question, a less complicated solution,
unfortunately, does not exist. This fact notwithstanding, the solution
proposed here is the best possible means for ensuring that Croatia and
Slovenia resolve the dispute in a friendly, negotiated manner, rather than
submitting to a costly, protracted, and uncertain judicial or arbitral
mechanisms.
